Some wider aspects of the Selmayr nomination

What is the outcry against - not the nomination itself but - the way Martin Selmayr was nominated to the position of the Secretary General of the European Commission? His personality and ways certainly play a role but everybody agrees, at least publicly, that he is suitable for the post. He gained both acclaim and enmity not just as a devote European (what is not always the way to please member state representatives) but also as an efficient or rather effective operator, who could be ruthless and manipulative at times. Politically speaking, however, his power will be more moderate while he is expected to shake up the apparatus of the Commission. Some parts and ways of it are namely too slow and too bureaucratic. This will no doubt benefit the EU as a whole but can also strengthen the position of the Commission in the sensitive balance between the three main institutions, the Council, the Parliament and the Commission.

Surprisingly after that, everybody talks only about the procedure, not the person. Heads of cabinet were parachuted to director and director general positions already several times (including the head or cabinet of the previous president of the Commission, Barroso). The trade unions always loudly complained every time this occured but this never hit the threshold of attention of anybody outside the Commission.

Apart from this concrete case, deeper unclarities are reflected in the debate. The general rule in the EU public service is that a post has to be filled by competition when a person is promoted into it. Moving officials or even managers "horizontally" can be done directly. Members and heads of cabinets of commissioners (as opposed to assistants of MEPs) are officials. They have, however, a political role and their direct nomination to senior management posts (director and director general) suggests that their seniority is higher than that of other officials commanding a team of comparable size. If these assumptions hold, the only complaint could be about the timing and the secrecy - which hollowed out the nomination right of the Commission as a body given the importance of the position. Leaving that aside, there are two questions concerning the justification of the above way of nomination: the equivalence of a cabinet post to another management post and then nomination of persons in a similar grade without competition.

Let me first mention a case for the "parachuting" of cabinet members and heads. Not nly Commissioners but also judges of the  European Court of Justice and members of the Court of Auditors are delegated by the member states and their mandates expire in different points of time. One new candidate declared already before the nomination to want to bring totally new own staff and thus alo members of the cabinet would lose their jobs. As members of the cabinet are public servants, their job security has to be maintained and there is no reason why they should be forced to accept a position junior to their previous one, by the way, this would be a waste of their talent and experience. A competition in this case would just mean insecurity for them and then further search.

Should cabinet members and heads be public servants? They need to navigate not only the political arena but also the organisation and experience and knowledge of this organisation is a significant asset as well as the knowledge acquired in a cabinet is for the organisation when they return to it. Their status can ensure professionality, objectivity and also continuity. On the other hand the basic question is how their status has or has not to be influenced by tue Commission becoming more political. This change as declared by president Juncker when he came in but the Council and the Parliament neither approved nor disapproved this. When they don't want to treat the cabinets as public service but as a political team, they mqy subscribe to a politicisatin of the Commission to a degree even Juncker didn't foresee.

The other question concerns nomination policies and competition. Here the first argument would be that even when Selmayr is the best person for the job, he didn't get the chance to demonstrate it. And this is the case for all nominations of a person of the grade ofmthe new position. I can see only one argument in favour: this makes compulsory mobility (which can be subject of a separate discussion but let's take it as granted) of management staff. In a lot of commercial organisations there is another case of nomination which is not subject to competition: the nomination of the immediate number two, like the deputy. Peters principle aside, there are a number of cases where the person has demonstrated sufficient knowledge and capabilities to take over and the superiors want to nominate the person. There is an infinitely slim chance that an external candidate can beat the internal one as almost all objective and subjective factors are pointing to the same direction.

Thus, if we want to be coherent, it has to be decided whether cabinet members and heads wre to be treated as officials, what their equvalence to managers is and whether moving "horizontally" without competition is fair and practical. I also propose, however, to consider opening the posibility of nominating the immediate subordinate of a manager without competition. As explained above, the chances of an external to win are minimal and therefore the energy wasted in preparing their application and the wohle selection process could be used  for better purposes.

Hungarians in the European Institutions

The European elections mark a change in the composition of not just the Parliament but also the Commission, election of the new president of the European Council and of the High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy, who is at the same time the vice-president of the Commission responsible for external affairs, head of the European External Action Service and chairs the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (all other Council configurations being chaired by the respective minister or prime minister or head of state of the country holding the rotating six months presidency of the Council, depending on the configuration).
Civil servants do not change, only some directors general may change posts (usually remaining directors general, just in another Directorate General), but this is a much smaller change even among directors general than the usual rotation after they have spent about five to seven years on their post. It is not going without attention, however, at least in some member states, how they are represented among civil servants of the EU (see here the British and here the French), in particular on management posts. So we will give a little analysis of what can be seen now in the “strength” of Hungarians in the EU.

The data and positions of the MEPs are public, and the Commission also publishes regularly different staff statistics. As far as the Parliament is concerned, the blog of Julien Frisch published overall nationality data. No data were found about the Council secretariat. Here is what Julien Frisch knows about it. Here you can find interesting research about the attitudes of Commission staff.

Hungary has 21 members in the European Parliament. Two of the members of the FIDESZ-group (EPP) are from the Hungarian minority in the neighbouring countries (Romania and Serbia) while three MEP-s won mandate from the Hungarian parties, one in Slovakia and two from Romania. One representative of the FIDESZ party was elected vice president of the Parliament – the FIDESZ-group already gave a vice president in the last cycle so this is confirmation of their position. As the EPP lost places, the support of the relatively large FIDESZ-group is important.
The distribution of Hungarians in the committees is not quite even, in some (the Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) there are too many Hungarians (OK, this will or could be the scene for discussions of the rights of national minorities, as here are two of the representatives of the Hungarians in Romania and in Slovakia in this committee besides the two MEPs from FIDESZ and one from Gyurcsány’s party; also, this was the committee which prepared and approved the famous “Tavares report” and also in the Committee for the Environment while there is no Hungarian in the important committees “Economic and Financial Affairs” and “Budget”. As far as vice-presidents of the committees are concerned, of the 20 committees and 2 sub-committees, four have Hungarian vice-president, among them one from the Socials and Democrats grooup (but not the leader of the Hungarian delegation of this group, who eyed a vice president's position in the Employment Committee,. The real power in the committees belongs, however, to the co-ordinators. Out of 56, 21 are German, 4-4 are Dutch, Spanish and French. All other countries have less posts – Hungary ne, and one vice-coordinator, both from FIDESZ.

The Parliament disclosed in 2010 the number of its officials by nationality (MEPs and their assistants have a special status, they are probably not included): out of 7652, 210 are Hungarian, which is a little more than the 2% (a little less since the accession of Croatia) Hungary represents in the number of inhabitants in the EU.

More detailed data (although only the latest status) are available from the Commission which is the biggest institution and also very important in preparing decisions. Although final decisions are taken in the Council and the Parliament, their staff has less influence on the decision of their institutions. In the Commission there were 2.39% Hungarians among the officials (and temporary agents, a category to replace them when their status is empty), this increased to 2.59% by now. This is important even if not a big increase, as slowly the return of officials to Hungary started: some didn’t like the environment or working abroad, the spouses could not accommodate, or, they were temporary agents and their contract expired (this was the case of several management officials).
The proportion of Hungarian administrators (the higher of the two main employee categories till the 2013 reform – as a third, lower category was introduced in 2013, their numbers are not meaningful) is higher than of assistants (the other group).

Statistics on management positions are currently not available (got hold of some before, when they were new) but we know that there are about 1200-1400 heads of unit in the Commission. We also see the composition of officials by grade and as Hungarians are not long ago in the organisations, it could be assumed for a while that those who are in grades where managers are, are indeed managers and not clerks who rose through time to a high grade. 2009 and 2011 data were published on the overall number of heads of unit and the proportion of Hungarians among them was only 1.89% in 2009 but 2.43% in 2011. Slowly, however, administrators who entered the Commission as AD5 or AD7, reach the level of AD 9 which is the lowest grade for heads of unit. So today’s figure of more than 3% can be misleading. A quick count through the EU Official Directory (showing management staff) and allowing for some people with Hungarian-sounding names who are not Hungarians but only of Hungarian origin – and the other way round, there are about 25-30 Hungarian heads of unit (so a little still more than 2%) and about 10 directors and equivalents, which always was above the 2%. Further analysis, however, shows that in at least three important central department (DG) there is no Hungarian manager: in the Secretariat General, the Legal Service and the Budget Directorate General. This darkens a little the bright picture shown by the numbers.

It’s election fever in Hungary. The national elections the 6th April will decide and show important things. As soon as they will be over and the parties have digested their results, the European election campaign will start. Usually, European elections are used as risk-free safety valves – discontent with governing (or in general „establishment” or mainstream parties can be expressed, without a consequence on domestic politics. In Hungary this time this doesn’t have to be so: domestic political opinions can be expressed in April and there will be no experience on the performance of the new government (which will be formed about a month after the elections only). Hungarian national elections also have seen a lot of protest votes and this time this will not be different. But this is another story. It can be expected that the campaign and the voting will really be about Europe, and also that only those go voting, who are interested in Europe. Thus, less Eurosceptic votes can be expected – save some surprise and a huge mobilisation by the eurosceptics – who cannot expect domestic advantage from the votes. What message can the parties give? More Europe, roaming fees, federalism, Agenda 2020, peace – or on the other side: national independence, exploitation, eurocracy – the latter are easy and popular messages but do not mean more than the ones in the first group. If we investigate, however, the national interests which Europe can support or hinder, there can be clearer messages. Hungary is dependent on imports (among them energy from Russia) and also on exports. Foreign capital is an important factor in creating employment. Hungarians are not as mobile as some other East- and Central-Europeans but still fairly mobile. Learning languages is paramount for young people and for job-seekers. Free movement in the EU is in our interest. To be able to export, we are interested in all measures to provide not just a level playing field but also abolishing administrative barriers, thus: unification of rules and practices in the area of trade, technical and security requirements, standards. And this also extends to the legal field: consumers in Hungary should be safe in buying European products and Hungarian products should be accepted in the EU as equally good quality and secure. Hungarian companies provide services abroad, competing with lower prices. It is our interest that fears from “social dumping” should not hinder our companies working abroad and our compatriots who want to work or study there. We do not want that Hungarians working abroad should have less social security because working abroad. So we are interested in a level playing field, good rules hindering social dumping so that this allegation should not have a basis. However, our budget and social security is not strong enough to provide the level in some richer countries and if we were forced to do that, we would lose our competitivity and even face serious financial problems at home. In the area of consumer protection and data protection, we favour a common approach and the possibility that the consumer or citizen (who would like to complain against abuse of personal data or unfair practices in selling or servicing goods) should be able to do it without having to b entangled in legal disputes in a faraway country. I will also go on to talk about other areas but would like to raise another question: who should be the Hungarian Commissioner and what function could he/she target? We already have some experience in the dealings and also the pitfalls of the distribution of responsibilities in the Commission.

Salaries of officials

The fight around the EU budget and the salaries of eurocrats continues. It has yielded some very interesting side-branches. A huge proportion of the EU budget is going back to the member states, although not to those who pay them in (The Guardian tried to set up a flowchart showing where the money goes but of course the euros (and pounds and kronas) are not earmarked. However, there are net payers (the richer countries) ant net recipients (who actually spend a significant part of the money received in the richer states), as one aim of the EU is to equalise the level of development in its members - out of solidarity but also out of plain self-interest. No one of the states will openly tell another one "I do not want to pay for you" although citizens and some journalists - in particular in the context of the debt crisis - do say things like that.

So what remains is the administration. Without echoing the allegations of the staff unions who see an intention to weaken the European public service, and without denying that efficiencies can be gained (where can't they?), this endeavour is not well placed in the eyes of an impartial observer (which I am not). The 2004 reform brought huge savings and the Commission is now proposing a further cut of 5% in staff numbers (and to reallocate staff internally to fulfil new tasks coming from accession, the economic governance package and a number of other projects aiming at competitiveness for Europe, research, etc.) as part of a wider package to cut other benefits of the officials (which are fixed in a regulation voted by the Council and the European Parliament). Negotiations on this proposal stalled as the member states did not accept the proposals. The EU budget is about 1.3% of the total GDP of Europe and administration is less than 6% within this. So big savings cannot be expected.

Salaries of eurocrats seem to be a stumbling block. In 2004, a special levy (starting at 2.5% and increasing every year till 5.5%/ was introduced on top of the taxes and social security contributions paid by the officials. This was tied to a method of calculating the annual salary adjustments. This method tied the increase of the salaries to the increase of salaries of public servants in the richer member states (to avoid that the increases in the member states due to higher inflation and the catch-up effect, as salaries there were lower than in Western Europe, should result in a higher increase). Of course the data have first to be available and so the changes take effect a year later. So after the crisis, there was still one year where the salary increase fell out higher than the member states thought justified (surprisingly, not in 2008 but in 2009) and then the member states did not want to apply the algorithm, referring to an exception clause in the regulation, for the case of an unexpected and serious crisis. The Court of Justice later found that that year the crisis was not sudden and not severe enough in its consequences to justify the application of the exception clause. The year after the cut in national public salaries had its effect on the calculation and the 0.1% increase was approved by the member states. The year after, they refused to apply the method again, and similarly in 2012.

Meanwhile, the method of salary adjustment and the special levy expired (they were tied to each other). The Commission proposed to extend these two elements of the staff regulations for another year, independently from the status of the negotiations on the budget and the Staff Regulations. The Council refused that which meant that the special levy (which gradually increased to 5.5%) also expired and all officials of the European institutions got a salary increase of about 5.5%. This was pinpointed in a number of articles in the press. One of them got a surprising reaction from a European Official who stated that he/she is a secretary and earns 700 euros a month. As the salary table of the officials is public, it is easy to establish that this means at least a grade 8 official. Given that secretaries start at grade 1 and the average time to jump a grade is 3-5 years (in reality, it can be longer), this means that this person works in the EU since 20-30 years and is still a secretary. Draw your own conclusion. If you want to see the Staff Regulations, you can find it here

By the way when member states - and in particular David Cameron, outraged about EU salaries compared to his own - complain about 1-2% of salary increases and "perks" of EU officials, Commonwealth officials received a 3.8% salary increase and have much more sumptuous perks - but this is Britain's favourite child, as opposed to the EU.