Complaining about double standards is the Swiss army knife of those who do not observe standards. Judit Varga, Minister of Justice of Hungary complains in the title and the last sentence of her article on Politico about double standards in judging the emergency bill recently voted by the Hungarian Parliament. The article itself, however, just wants to explain that the critics did not read (or at least misunderstood) the bill.
As Politico did not react to this although it also sheds bad light on their coverage - they did not accept my reaction, I react to it here.
There are several misrepresentations in the article: first, double standards mean mainly judging equals by different measures. The measure the critics use, is, however not different: it is whether the action is necessary and proportional in a democratic society. If it is not necessary, proportionality is not a question any more. The government already took the main measures before the bill was voted and the Act CLIV of 1997 on Health and the Government Decree 521/2013. (XII. 30.) about Health Emergency Situations enable taking all necessary measures without emergency state. The bill is also not about prolonging the effect of the emergency decrees of the government but gives the right to take measures in the future. By the way, FIDESz was able several times to pass laws within a couple of days so nothing would prevent them from enacting the measures in law. An example: the Academy of Sciences had 45 minutes (!) to comment on a draft bill taking all research institutes away from them.
Parliamentary (and constitutional) control is the weak point of arguments on the other side, too. FIDESz has two thirds which was only not enough to approve the bill immediately, the two-thirds were sufficient to vote it in urgency. The Constitutional Court consist also only of partisans of the ruling party. Therefore too much cannot be expected from them – so why insists the opposition on it? Simply because debates in Parliament and cases before the Constitutional Court get more publicity while government decrees can be kept secret.
The proposed amendment of the Criminal Code has to be read in conjunction with the present rules on sanctioning spreading of scaring rumours. The difference is only that the prison sentence can be two years longer and the formulation of presenting true facts in a false light is wider, giving more marge of manoeuvre to the authorities (two procedures have already started, both against mayors of the opposition for warning that the virus is already in their community).
Another test can be to see what others do. Just one example: in the interview with German TV, Wolfgang Schäuble found the most important to mention that the emergency situation is limited in time and its prolongation has to be approved by Parliament every time.
Finally, avoiding double standards also means judging those who differ with a different measure. Ms Varga would deny it with all her force but there are a lot of examples where the Hungarian government abuses its powers. Although hardly any refugees arrive to the Hungarian boarder (and even less can then pass) the emergency due to refugees is still in force in Hungary. Ms Varga warns from fighting against imaginary enemies when there is a real one. Hungary's government spent the last ten years fighting against imaginary enemies (Soros, the CEU, migrants - they are real but no enemy, etc.) and now, facing a real enemy, wants to use the very same methods. One morning the prime minister announces that there is no need to close schools, the same evening orders to close them. One day the chief physician announces that masks are useless, two days later the prime minister says they are not compulsory only as there is not enough and he himself made one at home - this after the 27th February the Minister for Human Resources (also responsible for health - maybe the name reflects that they run the country as if it were their own enterprise) and then several times the prime minister announced that there is enough material available. And they refused to re-group money from propaganda to health care (propaganda, as opposed to health, has an own ministry).
Articles written by ministers will scare supporters away, but not the virus.

What happened to CETA?

Now that the CETA free trade deal is signed between the EU and Canada, one can investigate without the dramatic overtones what happened.
First, the European Commission promised - in a reaction to protests, some of which also saw CETA as a trojan horse to the TTIP - that CETA will be submitted to national parliaments for approval. Voices were heard already before that one way of giving legitimacy to the European political process could be to submit European decisions - mainly legislation - to national parliaments. It has to be known that the Lisbon treaty already foresees a right of protestation for national parliaments (see for example: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271649945_After_Lisbon_National_Parliaments_in_the_European_Union or

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-secretary-general/resource/static/files/Documents%20section/SPforEP/Consultation_with_national_parliaments.pdf)

Draft legislative acts sent to the European Parliament and to the Council shall be forwarded to national Parliaments (each parliament has two votes, if they are bicameral, each chamber holds one vote and it is up to the national Parliaments to consult the regional Parliaments - this is a duty by Belgian law). They may send a reasoned opinion the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission why they consider that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity Where these opinions represent at least one third (in the area of the area of freedom, security and justice, one quarter) of all national Parliaments the draft must be reviewed. If half of the national parliaments  protests, the Commission has to justify why it does not change the proposal. These opinions will be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council.
(Article 12 and Protocols 1 and 2 to the Treaty on the European Union.)

The EU has an exclusive right to sign trade agreements with third countries. If, however, an agreement is covering topics other than trade, this prerogative can be questioned. An analysis can be found here: A guide to EU procedures for the conclusion of intl. trade agreements.pdf
Thus, the Commission decided that the CETA will be submitted to national Parliaments for approval (it contains among others a mechanism for settling investment disputes. This system was subject to heated debates (although independent investment dispute resolution mechanisms already exist, like the MIGA associated to the World Bank. Left-wing groups, however,  were weary of the perspective that their state could be sued in front of a private court. The mechanism (both in CETA and in the future TTIP) has been improved but this was not enough for the protesters.

And so came that one regional Parliament of Belgium, that of socialist Wallonia, rejected the CETA. One small region (in a country having maybe the most complex political system in Europe, where the Flemish part would greatly profit from free trade while the French-speaking Wallon part's economy is ailing) almost torpedoed the deal of whole Europe - this caused a brouhaha abroad and frustrated the Canadian trade minister Chrystia Freeland (she was even said to be choking back tears - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37735409).

The background is more in Belgium's internal politics: "The reason why the Walloon Region is trying to block or at least delay the CETA is political only. The Belgian federal government is run by the right wing whereas the Walloon Region is dominated by the socialists. The problem for the Walloon socialists is that there are losing ground to the extreme left. Hence, it is critical for them to show that they are fighting the CETA whose benefits would only to large multinational corporations. All this fuss about the CETA has thus to be seen in the context of Belgian politics. Belgium has an extremely open economy and exports much more than it imports. We are net beneficiaries of free trade." says Damien Geradine, Founding Partner of EDGE | Legal Thinking, a Brussels-based boutique law firm specialized in EU competition law and intellectual property law and Professor of Competition Law & Economics at Tilburg University (the Netherlands) and at George Mason University School of Law (Washington, DC).

Anybody who followed the ups and downs while Belgium tried to form a government after recent elections (not just one but the last two anyway), can understand this.

The Commission finally succeeded to convince the Wallons to approve the deal. This is not the first time that  a vote first hindering EU actions is repeated  - it happened to Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland on the Nice Treaty and Ireland again on the Lisbon Treaty. The Dutch and French no to the Constitutional treaty of the EU was accepted, but the project restarted and resulted in the (somewhat weaker and legally more complex but less strong) Lisbon treaty. It was, however, not just repeating the votes, the situation or the arguments have also changed, as explained in http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/19/asking-the-public-twice-why-do-voters-change-their-minds-in-second-referendums-on-eu-treaties/
There are two questions lingering: Will the Brexit vote also be repeated? What will happen to the TTIP? The latter question may be irrelevant, given that the TTIP faces much more resistance and that enthusiasm for it may fade in the U.S., too, if not already faded - and neither of the two presidential candidates is eager on it. No question that with Trump, we may bury it entirely but Clinton also treads carefully on it. 

What happened in Hungary's elections?

Weel, the facts are simple: the governing FIDESZ-KDMP won another election. It is second time that a governing party wins an election. We do not know until Sunday whether they will have the two-third majority necessary to amend the Constitution and the so-called "cardinal laws" (electoral, police etc. - they extended the scope of questions to be regulated by two-third majority to make it diffcult for the next government to eliminate their legacy). But there is a fair chance. As one who trusted that in spite of the strongly biaised election system and limited publicity afforded to the opposition, the hungarian electorate is sufficiently unsatisfied and politically active to vote for the finally united opposition(I will call them opposition alliance) - of course except the extreme right and LMP, which is the fourth party in Parliament, a green antiglobalist, human rights grouping. So I cannot say that the result was inevitable. Others, who predicted the victory of FIDESZ, are now looking for scapegoats which is also not a coherent behaviour. There were reports from small irregularities which could influence the result (in one district the municipality closed into a room whose door had been then welded, all voting slips while waiting for the votes to arrive from abroad - here there is verys little difference between the two main candidates). The votes of Hungarians without a fixed residence in Hungary (who could voty by letter and the authenticity of whose votes are very difficult to verify) could mean an additional parliamentary seat - all these count for the two thirds. But the fact is that 39% of the citizens did not care to vote. Out of those who voted, about 45% voted for FIDESZ, 26 for the united opposition alliance, 21% for the ultra-right Jobbik. There are some strange things: anly two (or three) constituencies could be won by the opposition alliance in the countryside while half of the Budapest constituencies were von by them. What is the big, decisive difference between the capital and the big cities? In one district, the reigning mayor lost. There were two strong candidates against him (which seemed to be the recipe for failure of the opposition alliance): an independent one who had a high profile as he was the ex-employee of the tax office who publicised a huge cheating scandal covered up ba the tax office and a candidate for the socialist party, who was involved in some embezzling scandal before. And, surprise: the socialist candidate won. So what can I offer as explanation? There are two differences between Budapest and the countryside: Accessibility of information and closeness of people. No wonder tha those who have no access to the Internet or do not use it for information and can access only the public broadcasters and the main commercial tv stations (and eventually the two tv stations controlled by FIDESZ) have no real picture of what is going on in the country. Their deterioration of livng standard and comfort is not attributed to the bad policies of the government as it began under the previous government(s) and they are convinced that a new government will also demand sacrifices. But they beleive the overall positive picture suggerated by these stations. They cannot by independent newspapers or don't care. The voting can be surveyed more closely and, sorry to say, manipulation is easier. There were constituancies where the number of invalid votes was equal to the advantage of the government candidate. Placing posters was deliberately made difficult for the opposition by different means - and the rules changed continuously - while the governing party could make use of their NGO and of government propaganda which neither was subject to the limitations. No party advertisement was possible in the commercial media (as it should have been offered free and none undertook that - while ATV, which is close to the opposition alliance, was fined for transmitting political propaganda (by giving speeches from an election manifestation) without registering its intent to do so in advance. In some marginal constituencies the phantom parties could also tilt the balance, although they received few votes. Two of them bore names resemblling those used by the opposition alliance. The circumstances under which these small parties collected the signatures necessary to post candidates were more than doubtful - some of them received fewer votes than signatures. Some commentators revived the theories that the unification of the opoosition alliance resulted in loss of votes as the different constituents were alienating each-other's voters. There was no strong message - and no way to get the message home to the people, due to the communication difficulties outlined above. The result is now there - what to make of it, no one except the government knows.

Some lessons from Tocqeville: Democratic despotism

Quotes from: Democratic despotism – Tocqueville: Democracy in America FOURTH BOOK INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRATIC IDEAS AND FEELINGS ON POLITICAL SOCIETY
 My remarks in italics 
Any resemblance to the present situation is just the game of fantasy.

"For the principle of equality begets two tendencies: the one leads men straight to independence and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a longer, more secret, but more certain road to servitude. Nations readily discern the former tendency and are prepared to resist it; they are led away by the latter, without perceiving its drift; hence it is peculiarly important to point it out.
…
This never dying, ever kindling hatred which sets a democratic people against the smallest privileges is peculiarly favorable to the gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of the representative of the state alone. The sovereign, being necessarily and incontestably above all the citizens, does not excite their envy, and each of them thinks that he strips his equals of the prerogative that he concedes to the crown. The man of a democratic age is extremely reluctant to obey his neighbor, who is his equal; he refuses to acknowledge superior ability in such a person; he mistrusts his justice and is jealous of his power; he fears and he despises him; and he loves continually to remind him of the common dependence in which both of them stand to the same master."

 The extension of powers of government to areas never experienced before, overzealous regulation, interference with economy, morals, everyday life of people is the consequence
After having shown how equality leads to loss of freedom, it is explained how and why they accept it and what is the illusion which makes it seem still democratic (what we have heard saying: politicians want us to go and vote every four years and let dem do what they want inbetween - an extreme form of this was the recent idea of the president of the Hungarian Parliament, László Kövér that even the Parliament should give a four years blank cheque to the government.

 "Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free. As they cannot destroy either the one or the other of these contrary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite: they console themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen their own guardians. Every man allows himself to be put in leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of persons, but the people at large who hold the end of his chain.
By this system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough to select their master and then relapse into it again. A great many persons at the present day are quite contented with this sort of compromise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people; and they think they have done enough for the protection of individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the power of the nation at large.
…
I admit that, by this means, room is left for the intervention of individuals in the more important affairs; but it is not the less suppressed in the smaller and more privates ones. It must not be forgotten that it is especially dangerous to enslave men in the minor details of life. For my own part, I should be inclined to think freedom less necessary in great things than in little ones, if it were possible to be secure of the one without possessing the other.
Subjection in minor affairs breaks out every day and is felt by the whole community indiscriminately. It does not drive men to resistance, but it crosses them at every turn, till they are led to surrender the exercise of their own will. Thus their spirit is gradually broken and their character enervated; whereas that obedience which is exacted on a few important but rare occasions only exhibits servitude at certain intervals and throws the burden of it upon a small number of men. It is in vain to summon a people who have been rendered so dependent on the central power to choose from time to time the representatives of that power; this rare and brief exercise of their free choice, however important it may be, will not prevent them from gradually losing the faculties of thinking, feeling, and acting for themselves, and thus gradually falling below the level of humanity.
I add that they will soon become incapable of exercising the great and only privilege which remains to them."

And a false remedy of this is to debate whether a certain election result really reflects the will of the people (see: two-thirds majority with 53% of the votes).

"After having exhausted all the different modes of election without finding one to suit their purpose, they are still amazed and still bent on seeking further; as if the evil they notice did not originate in the constitution of the country far more than in that of the electoral body.
It is indeed difficult to conceive how men who have entirely given up the habit of self-government should succeed in making a proper choice of those by whom they are to be governed; and no one will ever believe that a liberal, wise, and energetic government can spring from the suffrages of a subservient people."

But Tocqueville also explains how this trend can be avoided, how we can prevent that "democratic despotism" develops: Freedom of press and independence of the judiciary, transfer of power to elected local bodies, importance of civil society.
And here again a point which may be surprising: adhering to forms, not just stepping over them as things which do not influence the essence.

"Men living in democratic ages do not readily comprehend the utility of forms: they feel an instinctive contempt for them, I have elsewhere shown for what reasons. Forms excite their contempt and often their hatred; as they commonly aspire to none but easy and present gratifications, they rush onwards to the object of their desires, and the slightest delay exasperates them. This same temper, carried with them into political life, renders them hostile to forms, which perpetually retard or arrest them in some of their projects.
Yet this objection which the men of democracies make to forms is the very thing which renders forms so useful to freedom; for their chief merit is to serve as a barrier between the strong and the weak, the ruler and the people, to retard the one and give the other time to look about him. Forms become more necessary in proportion as the government becomes more active and more powerful, while private persons are becoming more indolent and more feeble. Thus democratic nations naturally stand more in need of forms than other nations, and they naturally respect them less. This deserves most serious attention. "

Not by chance, the limitation of the independence of the data protection authority, the ombudsman (ombudsmen) is clearly shown here as a way to undermine freedom and thus at the end of the day, real democracy (remember: people who are only free to vote, will l to judge correctly for whom to vote is in their real interest).

"Another tendency which is extremely natural to democratic nations and extremely dangerous is that which leads them to despise and undervalue the rights of private persons. The attachment that men feel to a right and the respect that they display for it are generally proportioned to its importance or to the length of time during which they have enjoyed it. The rights of private persons among democratic nations are commonly of small importance, of recent growth, and extremely precarious; the consequence is that they are often sacrificed without regret and almost always violated without remorse.
But it happens that, at the same period and among the same nations in which men conceive a natural contempt for the rights of private persons, the rights of society at large are naturally extended and consolidated; in other words, men become less attached to private rights just when it is most necessary to retain and defend what little remains of them. It is therefore most especially in the present democratic times, that the true friends of the liberty and the greatness of man ought constantly to be on the alert to prevent the power of government from lightly sacrificing the private rights of individuals to the general execution of its designs. At such times no citizen is so obscure that it is not very dangerous to allow him to be oppressed; no private rights are so unimportant that they can be surrendered with impunity to the caprices of a government. The reason is plain: if the private right of an individual is violated at a time when the human mind is fully impressed with the importance and the sanctity of such rights, the injury done is confined to the individual whose right is infringed; but to violate such a right at the present day is deeply to corrupt the manners of the nation and to put the whole community in jeopardy, because the very notion of this kind of right constantly tends among us to be impaired and lost. "

And about the relationship between the common good and the rights of individuals, where it is tempting to put the common good before that of the individuals:

"When any nation has, within a short space of time, repeatedly varied its rulers, its opinions, and its laws, the men of whom it is composed eventually contract a taste for change and grow accustomed to see all changes effected by sudden violence. Thus they naturally conceive a contempt for forms which daily prove ineffectual; and they do not support without impatience the dominion of rules which they have so often seen infringed.
As the ordinary notions of equity and morality no longer suffice to explain and justify all the innovations daily begotten by a revolution, the principle of public utility is called in, the doctrine of political necessity is conjured up, and men accustom themselves to sacrifice private interests without scruple and to trample on the rights of individuals in order more speedily to accomplish any public purpose. "

So, what about a revolution?

"...revolutionary tendencies, becoming more gentle and more regular, without entirely disappearing from society, will be gradually transformed into habits of subjection to the administrative authority of the government. I know of no countries in which revolutions are more dangerous than in democratic countries, because, independently of the accidental and transient evils that must always attend them, they may always create some evils that are permanent and unending.
I believe that there are such things as justifiable resistance and legitimate rebellion; I do not therefore assert as an absolute proposition that the men of democratic ages ought never to make revolutions; but I think that they have especial reason to hesitate before they embark on them and that it is far better to endure many grievances in their present condition than to have recourse to so perilous a remedy. "

A strategy for the Hungarian opposition?

First of all a fast summary of what happened recently on the opposition landscape: - Talks are slowly starting between MSzP and Együtt 2014 - Mesterházy, president of the MSzP was more diplomatic concerning his candidacy for prime minister in an interview - The hassle around the name of the Party of Bajnai, Együtt-2014 continues - New attacks were launched against Bajnai - LMP received the right to keep its faction in the Parliament. Some main events in Hungarian politics and the economy: - The tobacconist saga continues with new leaks about who from friends and relations (in the Hungarian translation of "Winnie the Pooh": "Friends, relations and business partners") - well, not of Rabbit but of the FIDESZ notabilities won tobacconist concessions - The new land law has been voted and Ángyán, one of the main agricultural eminences in FIDESZ, who became outrightly critical to the land policy and the distribution of rental rights on state-owned land to "friends, relations and business partners" who have nothing to do with agriculture, left FIDESZ in response - The merger of the National Bank and the Financial Supervision is progressing and the head of the latter -who is set to lose his job or at least his power even when he was the most faithful executioner during the first FIDESZ government of foreign banks who helped companies in transactions the government didn't like - wrote an open letter to the president of the Supreme Court (recently renamed to Kuria to be able to get rid of the previous president) calling the attention of the judges to the danger to the economy if the loan contracts tied to foreign currency would be declared "en masse" invalid. It is a little strange that the basis of this invalidation would be the laws on financial services he helped to forge. - The minister of the national economy (also fulfilling the tasks of the finance minister) announced a new round of austerity measures (forgetting to announce one of them) in spite that the EU liberated Hungary from the excessive deficit procedure under which it was since it joined the EU. Debates started immediately whether this is to enable the government to relax spending and start "bribing" voters with spending - some bribes were already distributed in the form of cutting utility prices but the extent is small till now - or just to cover the losses to the budget coming from bad planing and delay of some revenues (like e-toll for trucks and the tax revenue expected from connecting the cash tellers of all shops electronically to the computers of the Tax Office). What is the context? About the actors: Everybody knows probably that FIDESZ is the governing party (having and utilising, one may say abusing 2/3 majority in the Hungarian Parliament). - MSzP is the main opposition party if we look at the number of members of Parliament or at the results of surveys. It is also the party which was in government for the 8 years before the 2010 elections, in coalition with the liberals, whose SzDSz party practically disappeared and no measurable successor has appeared yet on the stage. - Együtt 2014 is a new formation, which was intended to be an NGO as an umbrella organisation for the alliance of opposition parties who want to defeat FIDESZ in the 2014 elections. They have foreseen to nominate the unique opposition candidate in the "first past the post" individual constituencies while the parties could go independently for the votes in the proportional part of the elections (as all voters have two votes, an individual for a candidate of their constituency and one for party lists - there are some other details which I will ignore for the moment). Immediately the election law was changed to exclude the possibility of NGOs nominating candidates. The organisation is lead by Gordon Bajnai, short-time prime minister of Hungary for about a year before the 2010 elections, who took over without long-term ambitions, i.e. he was not going to be a candidate in the elections 2010. He put the budget and the economy back on track after the combined devastating effect of the 2008 crisis and the spending spree between 2002 and 2006 and the aborted attempts by Gyurcsány for austerity and reform at the same time from 2006. These attempts triggered an unprecedented series of demonstrations which peaked in the months-long occupation of Kossuth square, the square in front of the Parliament which was also scene of emblematic demonstrations during the 1956 revolution. Another climax was when the 23rd of October, the anniversary of the 1956 revolution, police had to dissipate forceful demonstrations, which (it is debated, by whose fault) mingled with the masses of the anniversary celebration of FIDESZ (set in a place which had no relationship to the revolution at all but was dangerously close to the place where the forceful demonstrators were stopped in order not to be able to get to the Parliament). As a consequence, participants of the FIDESZ-organised event were also attacked and hurt by police. - LMP, a grassroots green - left - liberal party, which surprisingly won seats in the Parliament in 2010 (their name is the abbreviation of the slogan: Politics can be different), split along the line whether to co-operate with Együtt 2014. Those who favoured co-operation, left the party and were denied the right to form a faction in Parliament (just like the faction who left MSzP with Gyurcsány at their helm) while those who wanted to go alone into the elections 2014 kept the name LMP. Why all this? The election law modified by FIDESZ (and introducing a smaller Parliament which was already a promise by Gyurcsány but he couldn't assemble a 2/3 majority behind his propositions) foresees a higher proportion of individual constituency seats but even in the previous system, individual constituencies were the key to success. Before, however, if no candidate attained absolute majority, the candidates with the most votes had to face each-other in a second round, and also here, an absolute majority was needed. If less than 50% of the voters voted in a constituency, the round was invalid. Now, there is no such limit, and the candidate with a relative majority wins the seat, there is no second round. Before, votes cast in a constituency for the losing candidates were counted towards a compensating list, thus they had, if only a lower, value. Now, this system has been complemented with one where the votes cast for the winning candidate in a constituency, also count toward this compensation which also increases the importance of individual constituencies. Given that according to surveys, most of the voters have no party preferences, or do not intend to vote, in case of a low turnout and several opposition candidates, FIDESZ (who amalgamated all parties on the "right" (at least for: MDF, KDMP, FKGP, MDNP - no importance who they WERE - except the extreme right Jobbik) can win a huge parliamentary majority even with a low proportion of the votes (if there are three opposition parties including Jobbik, with 25%), not to talk about the proportion to voters overall. Therefore unity of opposition is crucial. OK, if this is trivial for everybody, why no opposition unity? In my opinion, there are two main reasons (apart from personal controversies), one of principle and one of tactics. As Orbán put his party practically outside the normal political spectrum, the opposition covers all political streams. Classical right wing (i.e. pro-market, libertarian which build on individual incentive and the responsibility of the individual) have no great popularity in Hungary. But still, the co-operation of parties from the most various ideologies and social models is necessary. And a close co operation, meaning even possibly (see the second reason below) uniting in one party. And they have to formulate a programme in common. A programme which is reasonable, coherent, acceptable for the opinion leaders and experts and at the same time one with which they can win elections against a populist propaganda - and deeds - of the governing party, in a media space which is outright unfavourable for them (I will return to that in another post soon - talking about the Tavares-report and Viviane Reding). On the other hand, FIDESZ has the possibility to change any law it wants, within days (and has done so, if necessary, see above). So if the way the opposition wants to shape its co-operation gets known, this way of co-operation will immediately forbidden or strongly disadvantaged. AS parties who have joint candidates in individual constituencies already are in distribution of the "compensation" votes (explained above). I mentioned personal controversies. It is taken for granted, that the opposition has to have one candidate for prime minister (who would believe in co-operation if they had more? I think even more sophisticated voters than the Hungarians would not be able to follow this - even I was stuck now when I tried to spell out this solution although I just raised it) and of course both the president of MSzP as Bajnai announced their ambition (what would an opposition leader without a PM ambition be like?). So that's why the flexibility shown by Mesterházy is important. Although no one precisely knows how the voters think (there is talk about this or that politician or party causing voters of another one in alliance with him/her/it not to vote for the common candidates), and there are undoubtedly risks in naming a candidate, the politically conscious population on the Internet (Facebook and commenters on blogs) mostly trust Bajnai most. His movement organises meetings al over the country, has a Facebook presence and is (just like MSzP, of course) an unavoidable component of the opposition co-operation. So it is not easy, but if opposition politicians and voters will look for what joins them, and not what separates, they may be able to get to a solution.

Storms

Demonstration near to the National Museum in Budapest two days after the day of independence when - according to legend - the national poet of Hungary (Petőfi, born Petrovics) declamated the National song on the stairs of the Museum, Snowstorm on the roads (that's wha the demonstration was postponed), storms all over Europe and the U.S. around the fourth amendment (how classical this sounds) of the Basic Law of Hungary, The forint plunging in response to - not the nomination but the first measures of the new president of the Hungarian National Bank -. ANd the European Peoples Party invites Frigide Barjot (no typo) to perform before the press conference of Commission vice president Viviane Reding (who, by chance, belongs to the same grouping) ti express herself against the marriage of homosexuals which is just being admitted in France. These storms on the surface hide undercurrents which have more importance for the future. The European Parliament - including the majority of EPP MEP's votes against the compromise long term budget agreed between the member states (but fails to request an increase). Good news: a compulsory mid-term review with qualified majority voting which could mean that a minority of member states cannot stop the EU adjusting its budget to the - hopefully - favourable future economic conditions. Greater flexibility, real own resources are the two further demands and a fourth one, which is in fact an increase in the amount: settling the backlog between commitments (promises to pay) and payments, which grew every year as payment budgets were always lower that commitment budgets. In a time of continuous growth of the budget, this difference would cause no trouble as payments are also later than commitments and thus the increase automatically means that payments - coming partially from commitments in previous years - can be somewhat lower that commitments in any given year. But if the difference is bigger than covered by growth, or there is no growth, the situation aggravates. Meanwhile, a bail-out is agreed for Cyprus. 10bn EUR instead of 17bn, a further 6bn is to be covered by the depositors of Cypriot banks vie a tax on deposits which averages about 6,5%. The European Federalists Party and the blogger of Reuters are enraged. The Parliament did not have a say (well, the national Parliament of Cyprus will have, and Cypriots already staged a run on their banks), they complain. It must be admitted, it is an unorthodox move. But if we think about the methods other governments (whether bailed out by the EU or not) put their budgets right, it is a song. In Hungary, inflation is 6% per year - the same toll on the value of deposits, just to talk about us. Of course, this tax is just a one-off solution (or will it be annual? I doubt). But it soothes to some extent the "northern" citizens who are already very sour about "their money" bailing out "irresponsible" southern states. And, given the composition of Cyprus deposits, it may be well targeted to some who hid their fortunes there.

The UK and the EU

I cannot let the week-end go without commenting on the speech of David Cameron on the EU. He wants to reform the EU or at least negotiate an "extrawurst" , special conditions, namely participating in the common market but have no other obligations, in particular repatriation of powers, mainly on areas where the U.K. has different traditions from the continental ones. A more flexible, more competitive and more democratic EU - who wouldn't agree? But there is a contradiction: if powers have to be repatriated because the EU is not democratic enough, is this necessary if the reforms succeed and it will be democratic? The powers the EU acquired were delegated by unanimous vote of the member states. It seems most states see the reason of today's problems in insufficient co-operation and not in too much power in the hands of the EU (which is not a bodiless monster in Brussels but the elected governments and also elected MEP-s), Cameron may have an uphill struggle. But he promised a referendum only after he will have agreed on a new type of membership of the UK. What can this new type of membership be: a two-speed Europe where Britain is in the slow lane (and then revenges by leaving the EU for being left in the slow lane? Oh no!). What is the new, more democratic EU going to be? Cameron mentions that the main role should go to national parliaments (not instead of the Council where he and his colleagues have the say, but instead of the European Parliament) as there is no united "European Demos" As there is a united UK demos (don't forget, it is not Britain as not only Scots and Welsh, but also Irish from Northern Ireland constitute its "nation". This model deserves some thought, maybe next week. What is the more flexible EU going to be: "cherry picking" was already refused and is also due to create a total chaos. My favourite scenario: A democratisation, cost cutting and competitivity actions - and maybe also some more flexibility can come out of the negotiations about economic governance and banking union, at least the conclusions of the December European Council point to a direction where serious limitations and tailor-made solutions will replace the "one size fits all" approach initially planned - are already in progress. The UK can keep its opt-outs and maybe generalise them or put them in a nicer light. And then he can say: I have succeeded in reforming Europe and our relation to it so we can stay. By the way: The UKIP wants a referendum now. What would be of the party if the UK would exit the EU? Not just Nigel Farage would lose his well-paying seat in the EP (where, as we have heard , he is also paid for a committee membership where he never works, but the party itself would use his whole basis of existence. Whom would they defend the independence of the UK from? There is a party in Luxembourg which remained a party after its program has gone by keeping to the ideological (populist) base, but I doubt the UKIP could find a similar agenda.

Turmix - mixture

Income per agriculture worker has increased 41.8% from 2010 to 2011 (was 74.5% higher than in 2005) in Hungary, says Eurostat. How come?

As usual, the New Year means the modification of some tax rules. This package was published in the official journal the 29th November. The 9th December the law which was intended to be the foundation for the 2012 budget, already modified it over four pages. (it was voted the 28th November, i.e. one day before the previous one was published).
The law about associations, public benefit organisations and the operation of and support for NGOs, published the 14th December, contained another three pages of modifications. The law about court registration and procedures thereof the 22nd December: another three pages.
The mentioned law about the foundation of the 2012 budget modified further five laws due to come into effect the 1st January, and itself was also modified three times (including once when the law about churches contained a deletion of one point of it). Further similar cases of other laws is listed here.
Update: the law on investment fund management organisations and collective investment service companies contains a further change: the deadline for reimbursing the VAT claims has been extended ( remember, there was a Court decision which found a limitation of tax reimbursement contradicting to European law). This hurts exporters and investing companies…

Still there is one case to be mentioned: An amendment to the law about the protection of non-smokers enabled smoking in casinos where there is no assigned smokers' area. A couple of hours (maybe this is an exaggeration but that's what the association against the smoking of children established) later, another amendment, voted before, came into force which forbid smoking in casinos altogether (again).
The tobacco lobby seams to be strong - in particular in the rows of the Christian Democrat party (an associate of FIDESZ with no independent existence and apparently no followers) as they already came forward with amendments which stopped Parliament from increasing the excise duty on tobacco.

A public procurement notice of 800 million forints (2.7 million Euro at the moment, in normal times closer or above 3 million Euro) for a media strategy has been just announced.

And a nice video, Viktor Orbán is asked whether he feels his responsibility for the disastrous performance of the forint. First he tells that the president of the National Bank did not fell responsible than repeats it and then says: "neither". The smile afterwards tells everything...

Voting patterns in the European Parliament - Hungarians among the illoyals

Do members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote according to their national interests or their party affiliation? My experience which draws on reading a number of committee amendment proposals to legislation, suggests that professional convictions also play a significant role. On the other hand, decision-making is largely consensual, so the differences in opinion are not necessarily visible in the votes.

The voting behaviour in the EP was subject to two analyses recently:
The Robert Schuman Foundation of France published a two-part report (http://www.robert-schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-189 and http://www.robert-schuman.eu/ question_europe.php?num=qe-190 while VoteWatch, an independent monitoring organisation, which collects and publishes interesting statistics on its website and also regularly reports on voting behaviour investigated in the first semester of 2011 the dynamics of voting behaviour in the three largest groups in the European Parliament. Their results were also reported in European Voice, a weekly on European affairs. The full report on power in the EP covers the period between 2009 and 2011. I draw the conclusions below from these two reports.

On the website of VoteWatch, also the loyalty of individual members is investigated and it can be seen that their loyalty is above 90% both with their party group and their national majority. This supports the idea outlined above that voting is largely consensual. One more factor has to be kept in mind: there are a number of votes which are not roll-call, so the voting behaviour in them cannot be analysed. This was the case when the motion about the new Hungarian Constitution was voted upon. The evaluation of the politics of the Hungarian government is one of the most controversial issues under discussion (you could even say that the FIDESZ party could polarise the European Parliament to an unprecedented level as they did so already with Hungarians). The vote was won with more than 50% of those present, 331 votes. Although this is mathematically possible without any EPP (to which FIDESZ belongs) vote, the proportions indicate at least that the EPP, the ECR (another centre-right, somewhat more eurosceptic grouping), the eurosceptics and the far right could have blocked the resolution.

Roll call votes can be initiated by the party groups and are usually enhancing
voting discipline but - in case of a difficult decision, can also lead to MEPs not voting, writes the Schuman foundation. Thus, there is no regularity in which question is put to a roll call vote and which one is not. Roll call votes are about one third of the total voting procedures. Since 2009, however, all legislative proposals must be approved by roll call voting (according to the internal regulations of the European Parliament.

Based on 16 votes in the first year of the legislative 2009-2014, the Schuman
foundation concludes in general that the right-left divide plays a smaller role in the European Parliament than on national level, as it coexist with the national affiliations, its role is increasing. There is also another divide: those who favour and those who oppose the enhancement of European integration. This line of course also extends between parties but is still not the same.
There is another trend: increase of the power of the Parliament through the Lisbon treaty has - in the opinion of the foundation - led to an increase of the role of national interests in voting.

The mixture of national and party (ideological) affiliations can lead to strange phenomena: European Voice concludes, for example, that French, Italian and Hungarian delegations in the centre-right EPP are more aligned with the S&D (social-democrat) group than other national delegations. "Among the seven largest national party delegations in the EPP, the Hungarian FIDESZ has voted with the majority least often (95%)." states the VoteWatch report. The biggest deviation was in the area of agriculture, where FIDESZ voted only 69% of the time with the rest of the group. On the other hand: "In the EPP, the highest degree of similarity in voting behaviour between leaders of the largest national party delegations has been between heads of the Polish and the Hungarian delegations." writes the report. European Voice also mentions environment and public health as points of dissent. The Hungarian delegation in other political groups is small and thus their behaviour is not analysed.

As there is no political group with absolute majority, coalitions have to be formed. These are nicely described in European Voice. The consequence I want to mention here is that the liberals seem to tilt the balance in many cases and they were the ones who were on winning side of votes the most frequently.

European Voice also draws conclusions on the dominance of some national delegations in the main political groups. The EPP and the S&D are dominated by the Germans. They form the right wing of the group, together with the Spanish Partido Popular. In the S&D group, the British - being to the right in the group - vote less with the group (this, however, still means 90% loyalty). The influence of the German FDP in the liberal ALDE group was limited due to the fact that the party is the furthest to the right of the group and prefers voting with the EPP. The most rebellious delegation, however, is the French MoDem, to the left of the group in a political sense.

If we add that most decisions are taken together with the Council, where consensus-building is also the rule but qualified majority voting is gaining ground, and that only the Commission has the right to propose legislative acts, a complex mechanism of decisionmaking is unfolding. No wonder it is so badly understood and can be the scapegoat for decisions the national politicians do not want to present to their constituencies.