Saturday, May 26, 2018
How to deal with "illiberal" corruption?
The other question is also raised in the context of the projects in Hungary where the government is distributing EU funds with an extreme speed - leading to suboptimal decisions in itself - and favours its cronies in this distribution.
As it seems that - at least in Hungary - these two negative phenomena go hand in hand - and the concentration of power and hollowing out of all checks and balances really ensures that cronyism and corruption cannot be brought to court or hindered any other way, including wide publicity, the two questions are mixed together.
Proposals are tabled which would make EU funds conditional on rule of law criteria. In terms of proper use and avoidance of fraud, joining the European Prosecutor's Office is favoured. On the other hand, soon a new Financial Regulation will be voted which will simplify the disbursement of EU funds.
EU structural funds are an important source of economic development, a positive factor in the image of the EU and also help cohesion between the countries (also by enabling that their economic development approaches them to each-other - they are also called cohesion funds). I totally agree with Markko Markkula, president of the (European) Committee of the Regions, who emphasised the importance of these funds in an interview already serving as a preparation to the fight around the new MFF, arguing that the cohesion funds should not be cut. A recent article (and one of a leading Hungarian commentator who can also not be suspected of being on the side of the present Hungarian government, arguing that austerity will not break the government of Orbán) warns that the cut of funds can be counterproductive.
So what?
My proposition is that the decisions (including acceptance of projects and procurement) should be more centralised and also more controls should be applied, covering the cost of these from the funds made available to the country in question. These controls should also depend on whether the coutry joins the European Prosecutors' Office.
This would of course require additional resources which is always difficult to achieve but even more difficult now when EU sources are decreasing due to the Brexit. Therefore the structural funds should be used for this purpose. This would not be such a sensitive cut as what is proposed in the framework of the new "conditionality" proposals. Also, joining the European Prosecutor's Office should be the precondition of applying the simplifications in the new Financial Regulation.
Tuesday, January 26, 2016
Why does the EU finance the Orban regime?
These amounts help to keep the system running. They amount to about 4% of GDP at the moment, may be as much as 6% according to the ambition plans, thus they are the source of the 2-3% growth (and may increase it to 4-5% per year in the future) with which the goverment boosts.
Apart from the legal problems which hinder the decrease or withdrawal of these funds, the workings and the logic of the EU does not enable to withdraw them.
I do not agree, by the way, that these funds should be withdrawn. These are used for good purposes, beyond some publicity actions like fancy pavements on the main squares of villages, fountains and other, well publicised useless projects. They make it possible to revamp the university clinics in Budapest, a lot of seqage and other utilities reconstruction in the slums and in rural cities, technology and building improvements for schools, transport reconstruction and renewal (all these are concrete projects taking place). And without the EU, the "small circles of liberty" we still have, would not excist or be much more limited. The Orbán (FIDESZ) government retreated on the media law, on forced premature retirement of judges, publicity taxes killing the biggest independent TV-station and much more.
It is still worth understanding, how the EU works. It is not a superstate (it is supranational, true, but neither a state, nor super), it is rather a co-operation framework. The Commission is more a regulatory agency then a government, inparticular not in the sense of the executive branch of most European parliamentary democracies (where the party or coalition giving the executive is also in majority in the Parliament and thus, as the goverment implements the party programme in theory, it is able to gain every vote in the parliament.
I do not think the basics need explanation here: the European Parliament has no governing party or coalition, all decisions require approval from the Council, which consists of the heads of state or government (the head of the executive according to the legal system of each country) of the member states, Commission implementing decisions (very limited and only possible when the directive or regulation voted by the Parliament and the Council foresees it) are reached through consultation with committees of experts of the member states and are subject to validation by the legislative (although ex post).
In my view the EU has three, relatively distinct coordination domains (not identical to the pre-Lisbon three pillars, though not unrelated):
First the common market - this requires a lot of harmonisation concerning product standards, like quality and security requirements. I would classify the land-based and porduction agricultural support and agricultural market regulation measures here. Trade and competition issues also belong here.
Secondly political co-operation which is first of all a way to increase the weight of Europe in the world compared to tis individual member states. Of course for this we have to talk with one voice- therefore a harmonisation of opinions is necessary, sometimes some countries have to accept that their opinions are not represented - of course this only works if there are common goals. This is the practical reason why this only works when there are shared values (of course all political co-operation requires common values an the values of Europe are noble and on the long term they ensure a lot of benefits, but let's stay on a practical ground.
Thirdly, the interest of good co-operation and the common values also lead to the recognition that too big deviations in the level of development are unfavourable and thus it is in the interest of the richer countries to help the poorer ones to develop, to approach them in living standards, technical and social level. The structural funds are the means for that. Let us not go into the debate how much of thesse funds are used in the donor countries as goods and services are provided in exchange and similarly an argument could be brought up that the awarding and managing authorities both also have an interest to favour local suppliers. Formally speaking there is no possibility to promote neither donor country nor local suppliers, but if one of these is possible, the other is also.
This interest of leveling is independent whether a country "behaves well" in the political arena. Legally it is clearly separated, but it is also not practical - a higher level of economic development and integration can also foster sharing of values but not the other way: cutting funds leads to resentment and even lower sharing of values.
We do not like the practice of the government in Hungary that economic support depends on whether someone agrees with the politics of the government - why do we expect that from the EU? We have to solve our problems ourselves, not rely on blackmail by outsiders to do it for us.
Sunday, April 5, 2015
3 years of the European Citizens' Initiative
The organisers get the opportunity to explain in detail the issues raised in their initiative to the Commission and at a public hearing in the European Parliament
The Commission is not obliged to propose legislation as a result of an initiative but has to publish a formal response – published in all 24 EU official languages - spelling out what action it will propose in response to the citizens' initiative, if any, and the reasons for doing or not doing so.. If the Commission decides to put forward a legislative proposal, the normal legislative procedure kicks off: the Commission proposal is submitted to the legislator and, if adopted, it becomes law.
The process can be found here in detail , so I will not talk about it more.
The Commission recently summarised the experience with the initiatives and published a report about it.
Since April 2012 till the date of the report, end March 2015, the Commission has received 51 requests for registration of proposed citizens’ initiatives. 31 of them were registered (16 registrations in 2012, nine in 2013, five in 2014 and one in 2015). 20 proposed initiatives did not fulfil the registration criteria and therefore could not be registered. The most frequently cited reason for refusal was that the subject of the initiative was outside the legislative powers of the EU and thus did not qualify for being a European Citizens’ Initiative.
18 initiatives have reached the end of their collection period (10 others were withdrawn before the end of their collection period). Among those 18, three initiatives have reached the required number of statements of support and were submitted to the Commission. Two of them have already received a formal response from the Commission: 'Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!' ('Right2Water') and 'One of us'.
The first one calls for: 1. The EU institutions and Member States be obliged to ensure that all inhabitants enjoy the right to water and sanitation. 2. Water supply and management of water resources not be subject to ‘internal market rules’ and that water services are excluded from liberalisation. 3. The EU increases its efforts to achieve universal access to water and sanitation.
After the organisers met the Commission and a public hearing took place in the European Parliament, the topic was taken up in the course of actions concerning the Drinking Water Directive. The evaluation of the directive is ongoing. The roadmap will be published shortly The EP Rapporteur presented the first draft of the Environment Committee Report on the Right2Water initiative. The vote in the Committee is provisionally scheduled for 26/05/2015 and the vote in the EP Plenary is provisionally foreseen for 08/06/2015
. The second one calls for a ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos, in particular in the areas of research, development aid and public health.
There was a meeting with the organisers and a public hearing in the European Parliament. As a result, the Commission has decided not to submit a legislative proposal as the policy of the EU is clear and rigorous rules are in place. 156.7 million euros were spent on stem cell research out of a total of 6 billion between 2007 and 2013 and Embryonic stem cells are unique and offer the potential for life-saving treatments, with clinical trials already underway. The Commission will continue to apply the strict ethical rules and restrictions in place for EU-funded research, including not funding the destruction of embryos.
The third one ('Stop vivisection') is under examination by the Commission and will receive an answer by 3 June 2015.
Looking at the aborted and refused initiatives, there are three main areas where most of the initiatives fall into: Social questions (of course the proposal for an unconditional basic income is one of them) like protection of minorities, cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of the regional cultures and a new European poverty criterion or the one to stop legal prositution, animal welfare, like “Dairy Cow Welfare” “Ethics for Animals (and Kids)” and political – some of them outrightly provocative like “Stop TTIP”, the one calling for a self-abolition of the European Parliament and its structures or the one entitled: “Should the current failing form of EG be replaced by one without democratic deficit?”.
A handful of initiatives dealt with environmental questions, among them the one of the three hitherto successful ones.
Still are open , one of them calling for an online collection plpatform for support of citizens’ initiatives, one to stop the climate initiatives except energy efficiency unless other big emitters also agree. A software tool for online data collection enables citizens to support a given initiative and organizers to manage its operations.
Further information can be found here.
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Sunday, June 8, 2014
The "fight" for the presidency of the European Commission
The same newspaper demanded already in 2009, before the previous European elections in an editorial that: "Voters must be told what they vote for. The Parliament's groups should tell votes who they want to be the next Commission's president. ... European Parliament elections have for far too long been presented... as a vote for Europe or against it. Political parties should change their approach and make clear that these elections are about what kind of European Union voters want."If the debate were about whether naming the candidate for Commission president is just that, it would make sense. I will try to answer this question below.
After the election, however, political actors start to discover the inconveniences of this idea and thus their disagreement with the principle.
The principle comes from an extending interpretation of the Lisbon treaty:the Council proposes "taking into account the result of the EP elections" a president for the Commission and the Parliament has to approve him/her by vote. It is only after that, that the commissioners can be nominated by the governments (one by each) and it is even after that, that the High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy (who is vice president of the Commission and chairs the External Affairs Council) and as the last, the president of the European Council (which is different from the different formations of the Council of the European Union, of which the the External Affairs Council is one) are nominated.
The system of institutions and the way the EU works is a delicately constructed framework and there is no doubt that the European parties threw a stone into this - actually never quiet and sometimes murky - pond.
So it is the European Parliament who finally approves the Commission president while it can only vote about a proposal brought forward by the Council. So it sounds logical that the parties in this Parliament can express whom they are ready to vote for. On the other hand, the separation of powers of initiative and approval is a feature of the EU which among others gives a power to the Commission national executives do not have - while the Commission lacks some other powers of national executives -, thus it is an important part of the above-mentioned delicate construction. The Parliament was in fact limiting the choice of the Council in whom to propose. The more so, as the Council has a majority of conservatives (mainly in the EPP) and this party is also the strongest in the Parliament. Had the Socialists won the EP elections, and the Council proposed Juncker the EPP candidate, not Schulz, the Socialist's favourite, the EPP could have still assembled a majority in the Parliament to approve Juncker. A nomination of Schulz could also been digested, in particular by Juncker, whose ambitions always pointed more towards the presidency of the European Council, which he could have won in exchange. But the time of these bargains is over, it seems taht eithe Juncker, or another EPP candidate will be proposed by the Council.
But why is Juncker's nomination in question? He is supported by Angela Merkel, the strongest national leader in the EPP (the French government is socialist). The opposition came first from Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, and then from Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and - Britain.
What makes the situation bizarre, is that although the question to be put was whether the voters want an EPP or a socialist candidate, the reservations against Juncker (and also against Schulz) are that they are too federalist. So we are back to the "more Europe" or "less Europe" question, which we should have forgotten. On this, however, the voters could not decide, as neither the ECR, to which the British conservatives belong, nor other eurosceptics staged a candidate for the Commission presidency. And - again no one knows whether due to that or not - all non-europhiles gained only 30% in the EP. A clear minority. We cannot go into the question whether this is much or little, why and how the people voted. It is widely discussed in the political press.
Before we deal with the Hungarian aspects, let's be up my promise: what can the European elections decide in terms of where Europe goes? Clearly, the power relations in the Parliament influence the direction, although no party has a clear majority and coalitions have to be forged. These are occasional coalitions, not like a government coalition. And some analysts like Professor J.H.H Weiler, president of the European University Institute (still a few but nevertheless I think they found the real problem in European-level democracy, the so-called "democratic deficit" of the EU) say, that in a real democracy, a governing coalition should be formed and it should define the way the executive works. The Commission, however, is not quite like a national executive. And its members are nominated by the member states and are usually adherents of the governing national coalitions or parties. Thus, the majority in the Commission will be conservative, but it is not automatic and there will be members from socialist and liberal parties. And the programme of the Commission will be set up by its members. Based on this, some could argue that finally the main political line will be defined by the political stream supported by the majority of the electorate (through both the choice of their governments and the elections to the European Parliament) but to explain to the common voter how this works is not easy. So the voters do not see that their vote has a real influence on the direction the EU takes. And the imperfections of the national vote (that you vote a general direction and a government may have individual measures and even policies you do not like but there is no party with whom you can 100% agree) is also present.
As explained in the previous post, the EP elections in Hungary had a domestic significance in spite of the fact that the national elections were less than two months before. It is more interesting to examine the reactions of the winner of both elections, the governing FIDESZ party to the nomination of Juncker. Of course, during the election campaign they did not mention the topic, it would have been couter-productive. But immediately afterwards, Orbán already declared that they do not support Juncker, who was the figurehead of Eurozone austerity, who is a "man of the past" and wants a Europe they do not want (i.e. too federalist).
And then Mr Szájer, MEP, explained (in the title of the article on the homepage of FIDESZ, the name of Juncker is incorrectly spelled since the 2nd June) the opposition in more popular terms: he repeated the antifederalist argument, that the interests of the nation states should be represented in the EU, but then recalled that during the government Juncker in Luxembourg, Hungary was significantly attacked. He called Asselborn, then foreign minister of Luxembourg the member of Juncker's party (which he is not) and also recalled that Viviane Reding attacked the Hungarian media law. Which in fact she didn't, she did deplore other laws which were more in her remit as European Commissioner and in this quality not reporting to Juncker. The latter mentioned this is his response.
Angela Merkel still appears to support Juncker, but left herself a back door: whe does not want to lose Britain for the EU. About this discussion next time.
Wednesday, April 2, 2014
Let's carry on - on the EU budget
Saturday, August 10, 2013
Minimum wages in Europe
Saturday, June 1, 2013
Other conflicts between the EU and Hungary
Sunday, March 17, 2013
Storms
Saturday, February 2, 2013
Salaries of officials
So what remains is the administration. Without echoing the allegations of the staff unions who see an intention to weaken the European public service, and without denying that efficiencies can be gained (where can't they?), this endeavour is not well placed in the eyes of an impartial observer (which I am not). The 2004 reform brought huge savings and the Commission is now proposing a further cut of 5% in staff numbers (and to reallocate staff internally to fulfil new tasks coming from accession, the economic governance package and a number of other projects aiming at competitiveness for Europe, research, etc.) as part of a wider package to cut other benefits of the officials (which are fixed in a regulation voted by the Council and the European Parliament). Negotiations on this proposal stalled as the member states did not accept the proposals. The EU budget is about 1.3% of the total GDP of Europe and administration is less than 6% within this. So big savings cannot be expected.
Salaries of eurocrats seem to be a stumbling block. In 2004, a special levy (starting at 2.5% and increasing every year till 5.5%/ was introduced on top of the taxes and social security contributions paid by the officials. This was tied to a method of calculating the annual salary adjustments. This method tied the increase of the salaries to the increase of salaries of public servants in the richer member states (to avoid that the increases in the member states due to higher inflation and the catch-up effect, as salaries there were lower than in Western Europe, should result in a higher increase). Of course the data have first to be available and so the changes take effect a year later. So after the crisis, there was still one year where the salary increase fell out higher than the member states thought justified (surprisingly, not in 2008 but in 2009) and then the member states did not want to apply the algorithm, referring to an exception clause in the regulation, for the case of an unexpected and serious crisis. The Court of Justice later found that that year the crisis was not sudden and not severe enough in its consequences to justify the application of the exception clause. The year after the cut in national public salaries had its effect on the calculation and the 0.1% increase was approved by the member states. The year after, they refused to apply the method again, and similarly in 2012.
Meanwhile, the method of salary adjustment and the special levy expired (they were tied to each other). The Commission proposed to extend these two elements of the staff regulations for another year, independently from the status of the negotiations on the budget and the Staff Regulations. The Council refused that which meant that the special levy (which gradually increased to 5.5%) also expired and all officials of the European institutions got a salary increase of about 5.5%. This was pinpointed in a number of articles in the press. One of them got a surprising reaction from a European Official who stated that he/she is a secretary and earns 700 euros a month. As the salary table of the officials is public, it is easy to establish that this means at least a grade 8 official. Given that secretaries start at grade 1 and the average time to jump a grade is 3-5 years (in reality, it can be longer), this means that this person works in the EU since 20-30 years and is still a secretary. Draw your own conclusion. If you want to see the Staff Regulations, you can find it here
By the way when member states - and in particular David Cameron, outraged about EU salaries compared to his own - complain about 1-2% of salary increases and "perks" of EU officials, Commonwealth officials received a 3.8% salary increase and have much more sumptuous perks - but this is Britain's favourite child, as opposed to the EU.
Sunday, January 27, 2013
The UK and the EU
Sunday, December 9, 2012
What we can know from PISA
Friday, July 13, 2012
Votewatch: how the Council votes
Sunday, April 29, 2012
Some lessons on overindebtedness
- Both Sweden and Finland endured credit bubbles and collapses in the 1990s, followed by recession, debt reduction, and eventually a return to robust economic growth. Their experiences and other historical examples show two distinct phases of deleveraging. In the first phase, lasting several years, households, corporations, and financial institutions reduce debt significantly. While this happens, economic growth is negative or minimal and government debt rises. In the second phase of deleveraging, GDP growth rebounds and then government debt is gradually reduced over many years.An enlightening example is how Sweden handled their housing loan crisis in 1993: the state undertook a lot of costs and risks and acted swiftly:- The historic deleveraging episodes reveal six critical markers of progress: the financial sector is stabilized and lending is rising; structural reforms unleash private-sector growth; credible medium-term public deficit reduction plans are in place; exports are growing; private investment has resumed; and the housing market is stabilized and residential construction revives.
- generally guaranteed all liabilities of the Swedish banks except those of the shareholders (this was important to avoid moral hazard);This cost about 4% of Swedish GDP according to Wikipedia (Its summary is simple but not bad). But the state required its price:- special agencies took over the bad loans and sold off property which had to be seized from non-performing borrowers - banks were treated differently (in three categories) according to the magnitude of their problem;
- the central bank provided liquidity to the banks;
- all actions were taken and explained publicly;
- The Swedish Krona was devalued.
- the banks had to write down losses and issue shares to the Swedish state; - the profits from selling the seized property benefited taxpayers;The estimates of the benefits vary and some (among them some big Swedish banks) criticize the solutions chosen, partially because in their opinion the state went too far and partially as no measures were taken to prevent the crisis from repeating. In fact, however, Swedish exports spectacularly rose in the 15 years following the crisis. The EU study referred to below states that all costs were recovered. some others think it was only the half. One more factor: An article from 1994 highlights an interesting phenomenon: while in the U.S. homeowners normally default if the value of their property falls below their outstanding debt, this is much more seldom in Sweden. A lot of material is available about this. Let me highlight a European Commission study first. The latest account with comments, based on a lecture by Urban Backström, president of the Swedish central bank (Riksbank). Bäckström States: "Thus it was important both to avoid a widespread failure of Swedish banks and to bring about a macroeconomic stabilisation. The two are interdependent. The collapse of much of the banking system would aggravate the macroeconomic weaknesses, just as failure to stabilise the economy would accentuate the banking crisis." And his conclusion is: "This is an immense task that the Swedes took on. Their entire banking system was effectively insolvent. Yet, they were able to fashion a workout scheme that had bi-partisan political support, did not unfairly reward shareholders, dealt with moral hazard, separated regulatory and workout roles so as to reduce conflicts of interest, and that quickly wrote down valuations and liquidated the bad debts as opposed to dragging the process out. The Swedish authorities should be especially commended for dealing with the liquidity and solvency concerns simultaneously, while keeping moral hazard to a minimum."- also, the shares in the banks were sold at a profit for the state when the banks were again trading profitably; - a supervisory agency was formed, separately from the one which took over bad debt and sold the property.
Sunday, July 17, 2011
Money from the EU
The other country figures also give interesting reading, however. I am interested in the states joining in 2004 which started with a low balance - all the Eastern Europeans progressed well but their development was different. Hungary started very low (all comparisons in % of GDP) but has now the most positive balance among Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland. The figures of Malta showed a steep decline, Cyprus is even in minus (I assume that the assistance to the Turkish part of the island is not included). As the last year counted is still 2009, the situation of Romania and Bulgaria who joined in 2007 cannot be judged but if they continue the trend, they can progress well.
The table summarising the balances by year and by member state is on page 86 of
http://ec.europa.eu/budget//library/biblio/publications/2009/fin_report/fin_report_09_en.pdf
Other sites about the same topic:
Further financial publications and also "myth-busters" can be found on:
(the label points ot the financial report, the publication above).