How to deal with "illiberal" corruption?

Two issues keep the debate around the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) going: one is about how to find a mechanism to react to governments which do not comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, i.e. infringe democratic and/or rule of law principles (the infringement of democratic principles is more indirect as the sheer outcome of elections favours the governments of Hungary and Poland - although in Poland the tide may turn - but the circumstances under which these governments win the votes are at least dubious) without resorting to the famous (or rather notorious) Article 7, which is rightly called the "nuclear option" as it is very strong and virtually impossible to implement. It has to be noted also that this "nuclear option" is not directly so nuclear as it strips a country from its voting rights but leaves all other right untouched - of course after this the other member states can vote other sanctions if they are in line with general law.
The other question is also raised in the context of the projects in Hungary where the government is distributing EU funds with an extreme speed - leading to suboptimal decisions in itself - and favours its cronies in this distribution.
As it seems that - at least in Hungary - these two negative phenomena go hand in hand - and the concentration of power and hollowing out of all checks and balances really ensures that cronyism and corruption cannot be brought to court or hindered any other way, including wide publicity, the two questions are mixed together.
Proposals are tabled which would make EU funds conditional on rule of law criteria. In terms of proper use and avoidance of fraud, joining the European Prosecutor's Office is favoured. On the other hand, soon a new Financial Regulation will be voted which will simplify the disbursement of EU funds.
EU structural funds are an important source of economic development, a positive factor in the image of the EU and also help cohesion between the countries (also by enabling that their economic development approaches them to each-other - they are also called cohesion funds). I totally agree with Markko Markkula, president of the (European) Committee of the Regions, who emphasised the importance of these funds in an interview already serving as a preparation to the fight around the new MFF, arguing that the cohesion funds should not be cut. A recent article (and one of a leading Hungarian commentator who can also not be suspected of being on the side of the present Hungarian government, arguing that austerity will not break the government of Orbán) warns that the cut of funds can be counterproductive.
So what?
My proposition is that the decisions (including acceptance of projects and procurement) should be more centralised and also more controls should be applied, covering the cost of these from the funds made available to the country in question. These controls should also depend on whether the coutry joins the European Prosecutors' Office.
This would of course require additional resources which is always difficult to achieve but even more difficult now when EU sources are decreasing due to the Brexit. Therefore the structural funds should be used for this purpose. This would not be such a sensitive cut as what is proposed in the framework of the new "conditionality" proposals. Also, joining the European Prosecutor's Office should be the precondition of applying the simplifications in the new Financial Regulation.

Donald Tusk declared victory after the first day of tbe European council, and not without reason. The perspective of agreeing to start creating an energy union was not rosy , several member states were weary to give up their independence, among them the Hungarian prime minister, who made several shady energy deals with Russia, including an obscure offshore company skimming the difference between the cost an sales price of gas supplies and a nuclear power plant (some ten years in advance of the real need of starting it, if energy needs i. 2035, the expected expiry of life of the present plant, is at all foreseeable) to be constructed exclusively by the Russians and also financed by a loan from them), but other countries were also not enthusiastic. So what about the result? Euobserver analysis is cautiously optimistic. The conclusions paint a more sober picture than the triumphantdeclarations: they reflect the limitations imposed by the self-interest of the member states jealous to save their separate ways: ..".the European Council focused on some of the aspects", "ensuring full compliance with EU law of all agreements for buying gas from external suppliers" - isn't this so without emphasising it? "confidentiality of commercially sensitive information just be guaranteed" -as if Orbán had it dictated... And finally: "assessing options for voluntary demand aggregation mechanisms" - no common buying arrangements, just assessing options; emphasising sovereignty and right of the member states twice. Some positive e!ements are no doubt a!so present: cooperation,reinforcing the legislative framework for secure supply of electricity and gas. So, the first small steps were taken. But the plans earned already criticism: this article reveals why the development of domestic energy resources and the freedom of member states to decide on their energy resources features prominently in the text: Poland is strongly dependent on coal and wants to develop shale gas. See also here So it was not just the reluctant followers who got their special deal, but also the leader.