Hungarian conservatives – emerging again?

 New Hungarian conservative parties will be needed once Orbán has disappeared from power but some think they also have a role to play in ousting him. Hungarians are indeed prone to conservativism but like being cared for by the state. The governing party, FIDESz is closest to their general attitude – except its social policies. Its grip on the economy and communications means that it can be defeated only by mobilising the undecided voters. These parties target them and disappointed FIDESz-voters. They sense that the gap which Orbán and his party occupied with success in 1998 and holds since, is opening again.

After FIDESz moved to the right, it won four elections. The traditional left and liberals were fragmented and their bad governance – the country was hard hit by the 2007-2009 crisis as bad management made it vulnerable – also harmed their credibility. Surveys show that undecided voters are more conservative.

This makes it plausible that the force able to replace FIDESz needs the rightwing. Most of these movements and parties cannot yet gain a lot of publicity, the press only rarely reports about them positively. Exceptions are, however, accumulating.

In 2015 Zoltán Kész, an ex-member of FIDESz won the 2015 by-elections in Veszprém, vacated by a local strongman of FIDESz. Next, another disappointed FIDESz-member, Péter Márki-Zay won a mayoral by-election in 2018, in Hódmezővásárhely, another fiefdom of FIDESz. When Márki-Zay founded first a movement, then a party named “Hungary of all”, Mr Kész joined the board. Other members of the board are also known and valued both by the voters of the opposition and the right-wing.

The founder of Új kezdet, (“New start”) is a well known conservative but he resigned to lead his municipality. The president is MP of LMP, a leftist-green party, whose faction is called the joint faction of LMP and of “New Start”. A vice president is independent, another one was member of the leadership of the liberal SzDSz during its eclipse.

The “New world popular party -2022” of a past FIDESZ minister and president of the Academy of Sciences, József Pálinkás started with a professional image (the movement itself was also called “Responsible Professionals”). They appear sometimes in the press – signalling also Pálinkás’ ability to break the wall of silence mentioned. The health expert of the party, who really managed a hospital, is also often invited in the context of the pandemic to independent media. Their team features two prominent foreign policy experts and runs a blog with expert contributors.

Peter Márki-Zay and József Pálinkás are candidates of the primaries in preparation of the 2022 national elections for prime minister. Whether they win or lose, their parties and “New Start” may re-create European conservativism in Hungary. A look at their programmes shows what we can expect from them.

Two of these parties (“Hungary of all” and “New start”) formulate their vision in twelve points (the young revolutionaries of the emblematic 1848 revolution and war of independence also formulated their demands in 12 points). All three aim to correct the distortions of the FIDESz rule – rule of law, fair and equitable laws, reinstallation of democratic institutions, the “New world” even outlined a short term crisis management programme separately from the long term vision. Each wants to stop corruption and join the European Prosecutor’s Office. “New world” and “Hungary of all” expressly mention joining the Eurozone.

Supporting Hungarian minorities in their endeavour to gain their rights within their country is prominent for “New start” and “New world” while “Hungary of all” wants them to be proud of a successful Hungary. “New world” also wants the EU to protect minorities. All three want to make it worth for Hungarians working abroad to come home.

In terms of law and political structures, “New start” emphasises the freedom of civil society and religious communities, “Hungary of all” the freedom of the press while “New world” argues for autonomous institutions and a smaller state. Publishing the files of secret agents of the communist regime is part of the programme of “Hungary of all”.

Economically, while promising fair competition, “New world” wants more EU funds for SMEs, as in their view, large companies are advantaged more than their added value would justify. “Hungary of all” sets on a strong competition authority and calculable environment. “New start” would reform the system of communal work for the jobless and would introduce basic revenue for social integration and social contributions based on needs (including social housing), while “New world” would prolong jobless support, which is extremely short now. Thus, all envisage some state role – even the least “dirigiste” “New world”.

“New start” is the only one to mention abolishing the single key tax system (a controversial topic).

Development of the countryside (including providing schools with local produces) is important for “New world” while “New start” emphasises the importance of local authorities. Sustainability takes an important place in the programmes of “New world” and “New start”.

Education and health are prominent in all programmes with a significant role of the state. “New world” strives for digitisation and spending comparable to leading countries.

As European conservatives have to clarify their attitude to Hungary, they should not forget the real conservatives there. Many of Hungarian voters are waiting for it.

What will happen to extremist parties?

The Hungarian extreme right won its first individual constituency in the Hungarian by-election. The latest times they tried to pull more to the center, their president recognised the Holocaust and paid tribute to the mourning of the Jews and said that imminent exit from the EU is not a possibility. Where do extreme right parties go? This is also the question in France. The Figaro, considering the future of the extreme right Front National, discusses whether the fate of extreme parties in Italy can be considered an example. Unfortunately, the free part of the article only deals with the communist party, which normalised itself "by banalisation"
What happened to the extreme right party in Italy?
The Italian Social Movement (MSI), a minor neofascist party, was formed in Italy in 1946. In 1995, however, the MSI dissolved itself as it was transformed into a new party (National Alliance) headed by former MSI leader Gianfranco Fini and including the majority of former MSI members. Fini's right-wing National Alliance rejected fascist ideology, including anti-Semitism, and embraced democracy as one of its principles and has participated in center-right governing coalitions.
In 1988, at the party's congress, Gianfranco Fini defeated the right wing of the party and was elected party secretary. After a short stint at the helm by the more right-wing Pino Rauti, Fini returned to his role as party secretary in July 1. During the 1990s Fini gradually began to move the MSI away from its neo-fascist ideology to a more traditionally conservative political agenda. The party won wider support when the pervasive corruption of the governing parties was exposed in the early 1990s. The project to form a new party, called National Aliiance was launched in 1993.
The party became a partner in the conservative government formed after the 1994 elections. In January 1995, the Party's congress in Fiuggi marked a radical change, afterwards referred to as la svolta di Fiuggi (the turning point at Fiuggi) and merged the MSI-DN with conservative elements of the disbanded Christian Democrats to form the National Alliance (AN), of which Fini assumed the presidency.
Fini began a personal evolution towards more socially liberal positions in the 2000s, notwithstanding the opposition of the rest of his party.
At the end of January 2007, Berlusconi declared that Fini would be his only successor in case of unification of centre-right parties, provoking dissent from theNorthern League and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC).
In 2007 Berlusconi proclaimed the dissolution of his Forza Italia party and the birth of a new unitary party of the centre-right, the People of Freedom. At first, Fini reacted coldly, affirming that AN would not participate, judging the way the new party was born confused and superficial, and expressing open dissent against his ally of the "former coalition".
However, two months later, he moved closer to Berlusconi again, soon after the fall of the Prodi II Cabinet. They agreed to present the two parties under the same symbol of the People of Freedom in the April 2008 parliamentary election, and then to proceed towards a unitary centre-right party. Here is an interesting description .
Between 2009 and 2010 Gianfranco Fini became a vocal critic of the leadership of Berlusconi. He departed from party's majority line on stem cell research, end of life issues, advance health care directive and immigration, but, most of all, he was a proponent of a more structured party organisation. His criticism was aimed at the leadership style of Berlusconi, who tended to rely on his personal charisma to lead the party from the centre and supported a lighter form of party, which in his mind was to be a movement-party active only at election times.
2010 there was a split from the party by Gianfranco Fini. It was soon clear that FLI would leave the PdL and become an independent party. On 7 November, during a convention in Bastia Umbra, Fini asked Berlusconi to step down as Prime Minister and proposed a new government including the Union of the Centre (UdC). A few days later, the four FLI members in the government resigned. On 14 December FLI voted against Berlusconi in a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, a vote won by Berlusconi by 314 to 311 On 30 July 2010, Fini held a press conference during which he announced the formation of separate groups from the PdL both in the Chamber and the Senate under the name Future and Freedom (FLI). On 11–13 February 2011 FLI was officially established as a party during a congress in Milan and Gianfranco Fini was elected president of it.
In the 2013 general election, held in February 2013, the party ran as part of the With Monti for Italy alliance with the UdC and Civic Choice and obtained a mere 0.4% of the vote, returning no seats in the Chamber and one in the Senate, plus two elects by Italians abroad.
What remained of the party started to cooperate with The Right, Tricolour Flame, I South and other right-wing parties and people to form a "new National Alliance"
On 15 November 2013, the day before the PdL's dissolution in the new FI, the "doves" left the party to form the New Centre-Right party.
The MSI/AN/FLI is not the only extreme right party in the West which faces tough choices and ideological turmoil. The Dutch extreme right – and a series of other alternative right-wing and Eurosceptic movements – are also trespassing hence unsurmountable barriers: The homosexuality of Pim Fortuyn is just a marginal issue, but some of these parties also embrace economic liberalism – if only to have a basis to deny redistribution to the favour of the poorer classes, who are more and more consisting of immigrants.
Can this be an example for the Hungarian Jobbik party, too? At the moment the Hungarian “right” is nationalising, but also stigmatising the poor and making their life even more difficult. But they also detest the “plutocracy”, the financial elite and want to develop a “national” bourgeoisie by giving them state money, mainly in the form of state contracts instead of enabling them to pursue freely their business. But Jobbik tries to show a more “human”, civilised face, to abandon the call for immediate exit from the EU. This will anger the “hardliners” so they may face already opposition from them – and this may start a fermentation. On the other hand, I hear more syrene sounds from the moderate right, which did not yet organise itself, towards left-leaning voters. While the left disintegrates further, there is no real conservative or liberal force. So there are more questions than answers. Source: mainly Wikipedia

The "fight" for the presidency of the European Commission

There was no big opposition against the idea that the European parties should nominate their candidate to the presidency of the European Commission as it was expected that this could boost participation. Apparently the participation did not fall as expected but many doubt ( see for example here) whether this was due to this so-called "Spitzenkandidaten" system.
The same newspaper demanded already in 2009, before the previous European elections in an editorial that: "Voters must be told what they vote for. The Parliament's groups should tell votes who they want to be the next Commission's president. ... European Parliament elections have for far too long been presented... as a vote for Europe or against it. Political parties should change their approach and make clear that these elections are about what kind of European Union voters want."If the debate were about whether naming the candidate for Commission president is just that, it would make sense. I will try to answer this question below.
After the election, however, political actors start to discover the inconveniences of this idea and thus their disagreement with the principle.
The principle comes from an extending interpretation of the Lisbon treaty:the Council proposes "taking into account the result of the EP elections" a president for the Commission and the Parliament has to approve him/her by vote. It is only after that, that the commissioners can be nominated by the governments (one by each) and it is even after that, that the High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy (who is vice president of the Commission and chairs the External Affairs Council) and as the last, the president of the European Council (which is different from the different formations of the Council of the European Union, of which the the External Affairs Council is one) are nominated.
The system of institutions and the way the EU works is a delicately constructed framework and there is no doubt that the European parties threw a stone into this - actually never quiet and sometimes murky - pond.
So it is the European Parliament who finally approves the Commission president while it can only vote about a proposal brought forward by the Council. So it sounds logical that the parties in this Parliament can express whom they are ready to vote for. On the other hand, the separation of powers of initiative and approval is a feature of the EU which among others gives a power to the Commission national executives do not have - while the Commission lacks some other powers of national executives -, thus it is an important part of the above-mentioned delicate construction. The Parliament was in fact limiting the choice of the Council in whom to propose. The more so, as the Council has a majority of conservatives (mainly in the EPP) and this party is also the strongest in the Parliament. Had the Socialists won the EP elections, and the Council proposed Juncker the EPP candidate, not Schulz, the Socialist's favourite, the EPP could have still assembled a majority in the Parliament to approve Juncker. A nomination of Schulz could also been digested, in particular by Juncker, whose ambitions always pointed more towards the presidency of the European Council, which he could have won in exchange. But the time of these bargains is over, it seems taht eithe Juncker, or another EPP candidate will be proposed by the Council.
But why is Juncker's nomination in question? He is supported by Angela Merkel, the strongest national leader in the EPP (the French government is socialist). The opposition came first from Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, and then from Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and - Britain.
What makes the situation bizarre, is that although the question to be put was whether the voters want an EPP or a socialist candidate, the reservations against Juncker (and also against Schulz) are that they are too federalist. So we are back to the "more Europe" or "less Europe" question, which we should have forgotten. On this, however, the voters could not decide, as neither the ECR, to which the British conservatives belong, nor other eurosceptics staged a candidate for the Commission presidency. And - again no one knows whether due to that or not - all non-europhiles gained only 30% in the EP. A clear minority. We cannot go into the question whether this is much or little, why and how the people voted. It is widely discussed in the political press.
Before we deal with the Hungarian aspects, let's be up my promise: what can the European elections decide in terms of where Europe goes? Clearly, the power relations in the Parliament influence the direction, although no party has a clear majority and coalitions have to be forged. These are occasional coalitions, not like a government coalition. And some analysts like Professor J.H.H Weiler, president of the European University Institute (still a few but nevertheless I think they found the real problem in European-level democracy, the so-called "democratic deficit" of the EU) say, that in a real democracy, a governing coalition should be formed and it should define the way the executive works. The Commission, however, is not quite like a national executive. And its members are nominated by the member states and are usually adherents of the governing national coalitions or parties. Thus, the majority in the Commission will be conservative, but it is not automatic and there will be members from socialist and liberal parties. And the programme of the Commission will be set up by its members. Based on this, some could argue that finally the main political line will be defined by the political stream supported by the majority of the electorate (through both the choice of their governments and the elections to the European Parliament) but to explain to the common voter how this works is not easy. So the voters do not see that their vote has a real influence on the direction the EU takes. And the imperfections of the national vote (that you vote a general direction and a government may have individual measures and even policies you do not like but there is no party with whom you can 100% agree) is also present.
As explained in the previous post, the EP elections in Hungary had a domestic significance in spite of the fact that the national elections were less than two months before. It is more interesting to examine the reactions of the winner of both elections, the governing FIDESZ party to the nomination of Juncker. Of course, during the election campaign they did not mention the topic, it would have been couter-productive. But immediately afterwards, Orbán already declared that they do not support Juncker, who was the figurehead of Eurozone austerity, who is a "man of the past" and wants a Europe they do not want (i.e. too federalist).
And then Mr Szájer, MEP, explained (in the title of the article on the homepage of FIDESZ, the name of Juncker is incorrectly spelled since the 2nd June) the opposition in more popular terms: he repeated the antifederalist argument, that the interests of the nation states should be represented in the EU, but then recalled that during the government Juncker in Luxembourg, Hungary was significantly attacked. He called Asselborn, then foreign minister of Luxembourg the member of Juncker's party (which he is not) and also recalled that Viviane Reding attacked the Hungarian media law. Which in fact she didn't, she did deplore other laws which were more in her remit as European Commissioner and in this quality not reporting to Juncker. The latter mentioned this is his response.
Angela Merkel still appears to support Juncker, but left herself a back door: whe does not want to lose Britain for the EU. About this discussion next time.

What happened in Hungary's elections?

Weel, the facts are simple: the governing FIDESZ-KDMP won another election. It is second time that a governing party wins an election. We do not know until Sunday whether they will have the two-third majority necessary to amend the Constitution and the so-called "cardinal laws" (electoral, police etc. - they extended the scope of questions to be regulated by two-third majority to make it diffcult for the next government to eliminate their legacy). But there is a fair chance. As one who trusted that in spite of the strongly biaised election system and limited publicity afforded to the opposition, the hungarian electorate is sufficiently unsatisfied and politically active to vote for the finally united opposition(I will call them opposition alliance) - of course except the extreme right and LMP, which is the fourth party in Parliament, a green antiglobalist, human rights grouping. So I cannot say that the result was inevitable. Others, who predicted the victory of FIDESZ, are now looking for scapegoats which is also not a coherent behaviour. There were reports from small irregularities which could influence the result (in one district the municipality closed into a room whose door had been then welded, all voting slips while waiting for the votes to arrive from abroad - here there is verys little difference between the two main candidates). The votes of Hungarians without a fixed residence in Hungary (who could voty by letter and the authenticity of whose votes are very difficult to verify) could mean an additional parliamentary seat - all these count for the two thirds. But the fact is that 39% of the citizens did not care to vote. Out of those who voted, about 45% voted for FIDESZ, 26 for the united opposition alliance, 21% for the ultra-right Jobbik. There are some strange things: anly two (or three) constituencies could be won by the opposition alliance in the countryside while half of the Budapest constituencies were von by them. What is the big, decisive difference between the capital and the big cities? In one district, the reigning mayor lost. There were two strong candidates against him (which seemed to be the recipe for failure of the opposition alliance): an independent one who had a high profile as he was the ex-employee of the tax office who publicised a huge cheating scandal covered up ba the tax office and a candidate for the socialist party, who was involved in some embezzling scandal before. And, surprise: the socialist candidate won. So what can I offer as explanation? There are two differences between Budapest and the countryside: Accessibility of information and closeness of people. No wonder tha those who have no access to the Internet or do not use it for information and can access only the public broadcasters and the main commercial tv stations (and eventually the two tv stations controlled by FIDESZ) have no real picture of what is going on in the country. Their deterioration of livng standard and comfort is not attributed to the bad policies of the government as it began under the previous government(s) and they are convinced that a new government will also demand sacrifices. But they beleive the overall positive picture suggerated by these stations. They cannot by independent newspapers or don't care. The voting can be surveyed more closely and, sorry to say, manipulation is easier. There were constituancies where the number of invalid votes was equal to the advantage of the government candidate. Placing posters was deliberately made difficult for the opposition by different means - and the rules changed continuously - while the governing party could make use of their NGO and of government propaganda which neither was subject to the limitations. No party advertisement was possible in the commercial media (as it should have been offered free and none undertook that - while ATV, which is close to the opposition alliance, was fined for transmitting political propaganda (by giving speeches from an election manifestation) without registering its intent to do so in advance. In some marginal constituencies the phantom parties could also tilt the balance, although they received few votes. Two of them bore names resemblling those used by the opposition alliance. The circumstances under which these small parties collected the signatures necessary to post candidates were more than doubtful - some of them received fewer votes than signatures. Some commentators revived the theories that the unification of the opoosition alliance resulted in loss of votes as the different constituents were alienating each-other's voters. There was no strong message - and no way to get the message home to the people, due to the communication difficulties outlined above. The result is now there - what to make of it, no one except the government knows.

It’s election fever in Hungary. The national elections the 6th April will decide and show important things. As soon as they will be over and the parties have digested their results, the European election campaign will start. Usually, European elections are used as risk-free safety valves – discontent with governing (or in general „establishment” or mainstream parties can be expressed, without a consequence on domestic politics. In Hungary this time this doesn’t have to be so: domestic political opinions can be expressed in April and there will be no experience on the performance of the new government (which will be formed about a month after the elections only). Hungarian national elections also have seen a lot of protest votes and this time this will not be different. But this is another story. It can be expected that the campaign and the voting will really be about Europe, and also that only those go voting, who are interested in Europe. Thus, less Eurosceptic votes can be expected – save some surprise and a huge mobilisation by the eurosceptics – who cannot expect domestic advantage from the votes. What message can the parties give? More Europe, roaming fees, federalism, Agenda 2020, peace – or on the other side: national independence, exploitation, eurocracy – the latter are easy and popular messages but do not mean more than the ones in the first group. If we investigate, however, the national interests which Europe can support or hinder, there can be clearer messages. Hungary is dependent on imports (among them energy from Russia) and also on exports. Foreign capital is an important factor in creating employment. Hungarians are not as mobile as some other East- and Central-Europeans but still fairly mobile. Learning languages is paramount for young people and for job-seekers. Free movement in the EU is in our interest. To be able to export, we are interested in all measures to provide not just a level playing field but also abolishing administrative barriers, thus: unification of rules and practices in the area of trade, technical and security requirements, standards. And this also extends to the legal field: consumers in Hungary should be safe in buying European products and Hungarian products should be accepted in the EU as equally good quality and secure. Hungarian companies provide services abroad, competing with lower prices. It is our interest that fears from “social dumping” should not hinder our companies working abroad and our compatriots who want to work or study there. We do not want that Hungarians working abroad should have less social security because working abroad. So we are interested in a level playing field, good rules hindering social dumping so that this allegation should not have a basis. However, our budget and social security is not strong enough to provide the level in some richer countries and if we were forced to do that, we would lose our competitivity and even face serious financial problems at home. In the area of consumer protection and data protection, we favour a common approach and the possibility that the consumer or citizen (who would like to complain against abuse of personal data or unfair practices in selling or servicing goods) should be able to do it without having to b entangled in legal disputes in a faraway country. I will also go on to talk about other areas but would like to raise another question: who should be the Hungarian Commissioner and what function could he/she target? We already have some experience in the dealings and also the pitfalls of the distribution of responsibilities in the Commission.

Is it a saga or a soap opera? How far can the Hungarian opposition play with the trust of its prospective voters?

There are a number of topics in my head to write about but the developments in the latest days have overwritten all. The question of the last moves of the opposition movements was always, how they can win the hesitating voters without losing their faithful ones. And this is getting hmmm... - but judge yourselves On the proposal of Gyurcsány, the most controversial figure in the opposition, a common festive mass meeting/demonstration has been organised to commemorate the anniversary of the 1956 revolution (which is at the moment one of the constitutive elements of Hungarian political identity). This with the background that the Hungarian Socialist Party (the main governing party between 2002 and 2010, suffering a grave defeat in 2010 and whose prime minister Gyurcsány was till Bajnai took over for the last year or so just to put the budget and the economy in order - which he did - without further political ambitions) and the movement of Bajnai signed their co-operation agreement, leaving Gyurcsány's party (called Democratic Coalition) out, citing overblown demands of the latter. Since support for Gyurcsány is growing fast. They even said that the Gyurcsány-fans will want to remove Orbán and the FIDESZ and therefore will vote for whoever has a realistic chance to do it. Gossip and speculation was abound that this is all tactics and they will agree with Gyurcsány at the end. Gyurcsány actually hinted strongly that the party finances of the MSzP were coming from dubious sources during their government years. And a fake video was apparently made by a Democratic Coalition "footsoldier" and given to an MSzP middle-level "officer" on which roma were discussing voting for FIDESZ in exchange of money and other perks on an intermediate election. Meanwhile, liberal movements with no real following that mushroomed in the years since the demise of SzDSz, the "official" liberal party, which was the junior partner in Gyurcsány's government and totally disintegrated after the - for them totally lost - 2010 elections. A conservative party also emerged under Bokros, the finance minister in the 1994-98 socialist-liberal governments two.year period when they followed austerity policies, economically very successful but politically disastrous. So, the speakers on the demonstration were the following: Bajnai first, then two ex-liberals - one of the Kuncze, who was minister and head of SzDSz for most of its heyday and declared before not having political ambitions but having a programme on Klubrádió, the emblematic radio of the opposition, mainly MSzP-leaning. Aftern them, Bokros, Gyurcsány and finally Attila Mesterházy, the president of the MSzP. Bajnai is not a charismatic leader and a dull speaker but has good thoughts and is speaking in earnest. So he was no surprise. The three following speakers all mentioned the need to co-operate to oust Orbán and then Gyurcsány showed his best form - he is charismatic,clever but some fear that his reputation as prime minister (he failed in getting through his plans and was always very outspoken but a Josephinist politician, not able to win support for his policies in his party's own ranks which may be the mistake of the "ranks" also) and the result of the propaganda against him in all FIDESZ media - which now includes the public media also - he scares away more uncertain voters than he brings. He was passionately arguing for and alliance of all opposition forces. And then, during the speech of Mesterházy, the audience started to shout demanding the alliance. Mesterházy did not give in, he calmed the crowd and finished his speech while people were leaving and he earned a scant applause only. After the event, explanations were raised and insults exchanged, I spare you this. The question was still there: what will those people do, who want Orbán and the FIDESZ to go but would like to have a wider front. And whether this narrower front - Bajnai's unifying reputation being tarnished by the events - will get sufficient votes to win. A little explanation to Bajnai: he wanted to form an umbrella organisation which would be neutral enough to enable that all opposition parties and movements can join in without having to lose their character. But then FIDESZ changed the election law to make such a solution impossible. Then Bajnai started a party from three different parts and started negotiating the alliance with the other parties. To add insult to injury (and thus cutting short a lot of the afterthoughts of the events on the demonstration) The party of Bajnai declared its support for and participation on the "March of the Székelys" for autonomy of Transylvania. Without going into the details on Hungarians in Romania, I can only say that the decision made huge waves - almost a tsunami - in Hungary. The main organisers of this march are the extreme right parties and movements and FIDESZ is also participating. So joining them is a great blow to those, who think that Hungary should not interfere this way with the neighbouring countries. Rational arguments are also there: Orbán gave Hungarian nationality to Hungarians living abroad and voting rights (although only half, but this can be extended if found as discriminatory by the Constitutional Court) to them (a slight simplification was inevitable here). Now, the Romanian State is asked to give autonomy to an area where foreign citizens also voting in their second country are concentrated. And already a number of high-profile members left Bajnai's movement for that. MSzP, however, voiced its support. These moves are also diametrical to Gyurcsány's point of view - that Hungarians should not interfere with state affairs of Romania but they support autonomy and reject double citizenship in its form given by Hungary and the voting rights of citizens outside Hungary. Heated discussion is going on on different fora about the decision of Bajnai. Many followers reject it, even saying they will not vote for them. On the other hand, the choice of those who want change in Hungary, is not easy if Gyurcsány remains separate. There is a chance that his support grows. But it will not reach the support of Bajnai and the MSzP together. And therefore the latter two have a greater chance to send Orbán away. Will voters vote for them and abandon Gyurcsány out of tactics? Or will voters rather vote for Gyurcsány? How much are voters bound to accept? Is the support of Bajnai and the MSzP for the nationalist movement bring new votes at all? It may, as voters who have national ideas but see the tragic direction in which Orbán leads the country, can be lured. But till now, they were told that the opposition is ant-national. Is it easy to change their perception? An explanatory note: the Hungarian elections will be decided in the individual constituencies, where the one who has the most votes will immediately win the mandate, however low the participation is.

An "example" of press freedom

One of the important opposition on line portals has exhausted its resources and announced that it will suspend and eventually finish its activities. Galamus announced that they are only producing debt since two months and the support received since their first call mid-December was not enough. The portal was radically left-leaning liberal and some associated it with Ferenc Gyurcsány, the ex-prime minister who tried to stop indebtedness with austerity against the resistance from its own party and also the forceful actions of allegedly right-wing FIDESZ, who wanted to explain the people that no austerity is necessary and torpedoed healthcare reform and study fees for universities through a referendum. It is not subject of this post to evaluate his activities and views, but the portal Galamus was not associated with his person and did not operate as the "house media" of his tiny party (he parted the Socialists). An important piece of media freedom is breaking down. This is the second time the portal is in difficulties, readers saved it the first time, and they also introduced a sort of "subscription" although the portal remained open. Thus, apparently, the subscription system did not work. I also sent them a subscription like I am subscribed to another paper, Élet és Irodalom, or in short "ÉS" Life and Literature in English, a clearly liberal, intelligentsia-oriented, high level paper, which offers subscription to its electronic edition (saving paper and being also more affordable), but as there only some articles can be read without subscription, I do not forget to renew it. Back to Galamus: a reader opened the space for "12 angry men" by sending himself 1Mn HUF (about 3 600EUR) - 12 times this amount would cover one year of operation. But smaller amounts from more people can also help. So maybe we will succeed again. I sent some money again and I also call my readers if they can afford to do it: IBAN: HU25-1070-0419-6649-3934-5000-0005 Galamus csoport. There was another magazine, more for the young and cheeky free-thinkers: Magyar Narancs , Hungarian orange. For readers who do not understand Hungarian, as a consolation that they cannot read these papers I explain at least the title. It is clear that in Hungary it is not possible to grow oranges in the open air. The Communist system in the fifties tried this, of course without success. A film A Tanú (The Witness) - made in 1969 but screened onlyn a decade later - has as one of the adventures of the hero to lead the farm where they succeed in producing an orange. Just before presenting it to the big party boss, however, his children ate up this rare delicacy (I think I don't have to explain the political importance of this - Cuba produced oranges which were only good to squeeze out their juice but not to eat directly.) Nad thy put a lemon in its place. When the big boss tried the "orange", the hero could not otherwise but say: this is the Hungarian orange - "a little yellow, a little sour, but ours". Have a nice week-end!

Together - Együtt 2014

Good news - Bad news. I'm afraid mostly bad news today. The co-operation platform launched the 23rd October (see my post ) was never promised to have an easy way. Its founder Gordon Bajnai, being an ex-minister in the Gyurcsány-government, prime minister thereafter, was exposed to "character murder" pinpointing a past business failure which harmed a number of small entrepreneurs who sold to the company - the links of Bajnai to the company then are up for discussion but he won a number of lawsuits on the topic which cleared him personally - that the comp,any was due to pay indemnities is no surprise as no one doubts it owed money but bankruptcy is the situation where you cannot pay and limited liability companies are invented to stop the failure of a business to cripple its owners. The panic caused among the ruling party (formally parties) is the good news, and also that the movement achieved the political sympathy rating which in votes would be needed to get into parliament (5%) within days is the good news. Its manifesto was signed by a number of personalities who have credibility (including the founder of the "Danube circle" or Duna-kör, which was one of the cores of the resistance during communism, taking up the symbolic case of the Bős-Nagymaros dam. However, one can hear voices that the signatories are "people of the bad socialist regime" - not the one before 1990 but the "pasteightyears" as FIDESZ likes to condemn. Here the bad news starts. But there are only two people among the signatories who were politicians and both were in the back lines, in particular during the Gyurcsány-government, actually both tied to the smaller partner, the liberal SzDSz. Some days after the announcement of the start of the movement as an association, FIDESZ changed the draft election law under discussion (well, this was an exaggeration) in Parliament to forbid for associations to participate in the elections. This is a sign of their panic, referred to above. Furthermore, the election campaign will be shortened and the media available for election advertisements limited to the public service media (i.e. commercial tv which is watched really is excluded) and to open air posters (in which area FIDESZ-friendly enterprises have a dominant position). Now this can be regarded already a significant limitation of citizens' rights in my opinion. A package of more than 200 modification proposals was submitted by one member of the FIDESZ and half a day was given to the MPs to read, discuss and agree in the factions. The debate was very short and - as is usual for critical issues - scheduled for late night. That's why I called the term "discussed" an exaggeration. Of course private individuals or associations can submit private advertisements which have nothing to do with the elections (but expect a scrutiny by friendly attorneys and courts - here setting the retirement age for judges will serve well). So did a pseudo-civil forum start an ad on buses (look at the picture) (of the Budapest Transport Company which is also managed by political appointees) depicting Bajnai and Gyurcsány together, with the text "they ruined the country together" etc. Some facts about the association: its president, who also organised the pro-government "Peace march" also mentioned in my 23rd October article, is also chairman of the committee distributing the government funds for civil associations (NGO's) and the association received government subsidies this year. So is this election advertising? And finally, the congress of LMP (Politics can be different), the anti-globalist green and human-rights-oriented party, which came from nowhere into Parliament (a nice feat in the Hungarian system) in 2010, refused to co-operate with the movement of Bajnai. The decision was more diplomatic, of course: the congress empowered the leaders to start talks about anything except joining. The also new 4K! (fourth republic - the present one is called the third) welcomed the decision which they took before. This formation is brand new, was created by secession from Milla ("a million for the freedom of Hungarian press", a movement which started on Facebook, achieved about a hundred thousand likes but staged several successful demonstrations - one of these was the 23rd October referred to above where Bajnai announced starting the movement Együtt 2014 (Together 2014, latter being the year of the next elections). Its leader said that they want to resemble most the Scandinavian social democrats, thus they also have a left-wing programme. So two new formations refused co-operation. 4K! could be considered irrelevant (their reaction to the announcement of president Barroso on a federal Europe simply was that they also require the harmonisation of social systems - in a tone as if they were an important political player in a powerful member state and also ignoring that this is to some extent already the case. The "loss" of LMP is also more a loss of image for the new movement as this step may cost LMP more voters than the new movement. The head of the parliamentary faction and his deputy immediately resigned, calling the decision irresponsible and unrealistic both for the party and for the country. Their announcement was greeted with loud "hurray"-s and applause probably by the 77 who voted against the decision (97 voted for). The diplomatic formulation of the decision leaves a small opening to return but already called disappointing comments from some blogs and commenters on websites and also on Facebook.

23 October in Hungary

We are living in challenging times aren't we? To increase the enthusiasm of its followers who staged a demonstration the 21st January to support them and to show that Hungary does not want to be a colony (whoever wants to colonise it - there is a joke that all alliances which were joined by Hungary have collapsed and the EU is also in big trouble now), the rumour was raised that if this "Peace march" had not taken place, the EU (or the IMF, you never know who is the actual enemy) would have caused his demise. So as the January march was a response to the opposition demonstration (the biggest and most successful of its type since long), now they staged a second "Peace march" simultaneously to the opposition demonstration on the anniversary of the 1956 revolution (or was it a late reaction on the also successful March 15 opposition demonstration?). This time Van Rompuy was favouring Orban (last year he called a European Council meeting for the 23rd October and thus Orbán could not speak on the FIDESZ/government demonstration and therefore the whole demonstration was cancelled) and so he could be the main orator on the government festive assembly, which was also the final point of the "Peace marchers". Let me save you - and myself - from commenting on the numbers and on the foreign participants and those who were bussed from the countryside from our taxes. It was more interesting what happened on the opposition demonstration and around it: Gordon Bajnai, the ex-prime minister of Hungary, whose face is like that of a young pioneer, and who never was a big orator, but "blackmailed" the government (socialist and liberal) factions of the previous Hungarian Parliament to support his almost neo-liberal austerity programme - simply putting the Hungarian budget back on track by avoiding the collapse of the budget. It is forgotten that meanwhile he could also set up a programme to collect memories of still living witnesses of the 1956 revolution and the times around it. He was a businessman before, and this makes him vulnerable to "character murder" by distributing rumours that a failure of one of his ventures was pushing his suppliers to commit suicide as he did not pay them. As FIDESZ follows left-wing policies and almost the whole opposition is leftist, quite a number of opposition forces are at most moderately enthusiastic about him as prospective leader of the opposition. Why should he? Because the election laws were thwarted by FIDESZ in a way that - there is no lower participation limit to the validity of elections and - there is no second round. This means that even if most of the voters do not vote, the candidate winning the most votes will take the constituency. Thus the opposition has to have a single candidate and convince those who do not like the present government, but are disappointed with politics as such or do not like the common candidate (who can represent only one of the divergent opposition forces) to go voting and vote against FIDESZ. Additionally, most probably only those will be able to vote, who register in advance. About this another time but this means that only citizens with a strong conviction and ready to take some inconvenience on them will vote which decreases the chances of the opposition. I do not agree, however, with those who look at the divergences and reservations with horror: it is maybe better not to lay all cards on the table. If a strong opposition unity will be visible, the government may change the election system again, quoting the critics, and use the fact that they are formally two parties, to favour themselves again. So challenging times now? Rather ahead of us,

Votewatch: how the Council votes

Votewatch.eu has now started to follow votes in the Council although this is much more difficult. Surprising results: not only the U.K. but also Germany and Austria frequently voted against the majority (29, 16 and 16%, respectively). The U.K. actually also voted most against these two states and vice versa. The countries with the fewest "No" votes in the last three years (of which two were under the "liberation war" government of Viktor Orban) were Lithuania, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania and Slovakia. As far as Hungary is concerend, out of 10 negative votes, 2 fall to the period of the Orban government. The votes recorded are only final formal votes where the motion was accepted. Of course, "no" votes in case of rejected motions would count to be majority votes anyway. It also has to be noted that 65% of votes where a qualified majority was sufficient, unanimity was nevertheless achieved. (analysis based on European Voice

Breaking news: New Hungarian Liberal Civic Party in the making!

OK, I was at least as bombastic as a tabloid but still: the first sentences of a programme have been published and another blog pőublished a similar call . This is not the first expression of desire but till now everybody just dreamt of it - and expected others to come up- but now someone at least was undertaking an initiative. In a normal environment, you could ask, what is a party initiative on a blog worth? In Hungary, however, the most politically active who do not belong to the mainstream parties are present in the blogosphere or on Facebook. Well, Orbán, the prime minister claimed in the European Parliament that they won the 2010 elections on the Internet and on Facebook. If this is (rightly) not convincing, think about the "Milla" who organised the most successful opposition demonstrations since FIDESZ is in government. This organisation gave birth to the party "Fourth Republic" . I am afraid that some explanation is due. The first republic was the one after the first World War, the second after the second, both were followed by communist rule. The third republic counts its days from since the system change, 1990. So the party wants to establish the fourth one, as the resources of the third one are depleted and there is imminent danger that a Putinist system will replace it. What are the chances of a liberal civic party? Can it gain sufficient votes? Is "civic" bourgeois or citoyen (the two different meaning of the Hungarian word "polgári" which I translated to civic? "Civic" is there in the name of FIDESZ, the now ruling party. They understand it (if at all) as supporting their clientèle, mainly the wealthy among them, by government interventionism (and even by unlawful methods which are justified by retroactive legislation or formalistic application and using gaps in the law). Apart from their support for the rich, they are not right wing, they practice social demagogy and state interventionism in everything including sexual morale, education, economy, culture... Jobbik is a nationalist populist party who wants to exit the EU and re-instate national ownership. The border on the extreme left in their economic programme (which is by far not coherent). LMP is an antiglobalistic green party. MSzP has implemented neo-liberal policies against its will and is widely seen as the party of people who only serve their own good. The Democratic Coalition of ex-prime minister Gyurcsány regards itself as a leftist liberal but also sees that it has a Socialist past and that it can only gain support by maintaining left-wing rethoric. The liberals and the conservative (were they?) MDF disappeared among scandals. This is a separate story in itself but not worth mentioning at the moment. So what are the chances? Right-wing in Hungary always meant nationalism. There is no one who can address the national questions in a way that would be European, progressive and realistic and at the same time appealing emotionally. Of course real liberal, pro-enterprise policies are missing and would appeal to a lot of "opinion-leaders" but would have a slim support in the countryside. Finally, the election system is such that one strong alliance could only defeat FIDESZ. The individual election constituencies are single-round, first-past-the-post and no validity limit is set. So if the 54% who cannot chose a party now do not vote, and there are six parties (which is realistic now), 9% is enough to win a seat. And the winner in the individual constituencies wins additional seats on the lists. So if a party wins the individual seats (50%) and some places on the lists, it can already even have 2/3 but surely a majority. Questions abound....

Voting patterns in the European Parliament - Hungarians among the illoyals

Do members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote according to their national interests or their party affiliation? My experience which draws on reading a number of committee amendment proposals to legislation, suggests that professional convictions also play a significant role. On the other hand, decision-making is largely consensual, so the differences in opinion are not necessarily visible in the votes.

The voting behaviour in the EP was subject to two analyses recently:
The Robert Schuman Foundation of France published a two-part report (http://www.robert-schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-189 and http://www.robert-schuman.eu/ question_europe.php?num=qe-190 while VoteWatch, an independent monitoring organisation, which collects and publishes interesting statistics on its website and also regularly reports on voting behaviour investigated in the first semester of 2011 the dynamics of voting behaviour in the three largest groups in the European Parliament. Their results were also reported in European Voice, a weekly on European affairs. The full report on power in the EP covers the period between 2009 and 2011. I draw the conclusions below from these two reports.

On the website of VoteWatch, also the loyalty of individual members is investigated and it can be seen that their loyalty is above 90% both with their party group and their national majority. This supports the idea outlined above that voting is largely consensual. One more factor has to be kept in mind: there are a number of votes which are not roll-call, so the voting behaviour in them cannot be analysed. This was the case when the motion about the new Hungarian Constitution was voted upon. The evaluation of the politics of the Hungarian government is one of the most controversial issues under discussion (you could even say that the FIDESZ party could polarise the European Parliament to an unprecedented level as they did so already with Hungarians). The vote was won with more than 50% of those present, 331 votes. Although this is mathematically possible without any EPP (to which FIDESZ belongs) vote, the proportions indicate at least that the EPP, the ECR (another centre-right, somewhat more eurosceptic grouping), the eurosceptics and the far right could have blocked the resolution.

Roll call votes can be initiated by the party groups and are usually enhancing
voting discipline but - in case of a difficult decision, can also lead to MEPs not voting, writes the Schuman foundation. Thus, there is no regularity in which question is put to a roll call vote and which one is not. Roll call votes are about one third of the total voting procedures. Since 2009, however, all legislative proposals must be approved by roll call voting (according to the internal regulations of the European Parliament.

Based on 16 votes in the first year of the legislative 2009-2014, the Schuman
foundation concludes in general that the right-left divide plays a smaller role in the European Parliament than on national level, as it coexist with the national affiliations, its role is increasing. There is also another divide: those who favour and those who oppose the enhancement of European integration. This line of course also extends between parties but is still not the same.
There is another trend: increase of the power of the Parliament through the Lisbon treaty has - in the opinion of the foundation - led to an increase of the role of national interests in voting.

The mixture of national and party (ideological) affiliations can lead to strange phenomena: European Voice concludes, for example, that French, Italian and Hungarian delegations in the centre-right EPP are more aligned with the S&D (social-democrat) group than other national delegations. "Among the seven largest national party delegations in the EPP, the Hungarian FIDESZ has voted with the majority least often (95%)." states the VoteWatch report. The biggest deviation was in the area of agriculture, where FIDESZ voted only 69% of the time with the rest of the group. On the other hand: "In the EPP, the highest degree of similarity in voting behaviour between leaders of the largest national party delegations has been between heads of the Polish and the Hungarian delegations." writes the report. European Voice also mentions environment and public health as points of dissent. The Hungarian delegation in other political groups is small and thus their behaviour is not analysed.

As there is no political group with absolute majority, coalitions have to be formed. These are nicely described in European Voice. The consequence I want to mention here is that the liberals seem to tilt the balance in many cases and they were the ones who were on winning side of votes the most frequently.

European Voice also draws conclusions on the dominance of some national delegations in the main political groups. The EPP and the S&D are dominated by the Germans. They form the right wing of the group, together with the Spanish Partido Popular. In the S&D group, the British - being to the right in the group - vote less with the group (this, however, still means 90% loyalty). The influence of the German FDP in the liberal ALDE group was limited due to the fact that the party is the furthest to the right of the group and prefers voting with the EPP. The most rebellious delegation, however, is the French MoDem, to the left of the group in a political sense.

If we add that most decisions are taken together with the Council, where consensus-building is also the rule but qualified majority voting is gaining ground, and that only the Commission has the right to propose legislative acts, a complex mechanism of decisionmaking is unfolding. No wonder it is so badly understood and can be the scapegoat for decisions the national politicians do not want to present to their constituencies.