Complaining about double standards is the Swiss army knife of those who do not observe standards. Judit Varga, Minister of Justice of Hungary complains in the title and the last sentence of her article on Politico about double standards in judging the emergency bill recently voted by the Hungarian Parliament. The article itself, however, just wants to explain that the critics did not read (or at least misunderstood) the bill.
As Politico did not react to this although it also sheds bad light on their coverage - they did not accept my reaction, I react to it here.
There are several misrepresentations in the article: first, double standards mean mainly judging equals by different measures. The measure the critics use, is, however not different: it is whether the action is necessary and proportional in a democratic society. If it is not necessary, proportionality is not a question any more. The government already took the main measures before the bill was voted and the Act CLIV of 1997 on Health and the Government Decree 521/2013. (XII. 30.) about Health Emergency Situations enable taking all necessary measures without emergency state. The bill is also not about prolonging the effect of the emergency decrees of the government but gives the right to take measures in the future. By the way, FIDESz was able several times to pass laws within a couple of days so nothing would prevent them from enacting the measures in law. An example: the Academy of Sciences had 45 minutes (!) to comment on a draft bill taking all research institutes away from them.
Parliamentary (and constitutional) control is the weak point of arguments on the other side, too. FIDESz has two thirds which was only not enough to approve the bill immediately, the two-thirds were sufficient to vote it in urgency. The Constitutional Court consist also only of partisans of the ruling party. Therefore too much cannot be expected from them – so why insists the opposition on it? Simply because debates in Parliament and cases before the Constitutional Court get more publicity while government decrees can be kept secret.
The proposed amendment of the Criminal Code has to be read in conjunction with the present rules on sanctioning spreading of scaring rumours. The difference is only that the prison sentence can be two years longer and the formulation of presenting true facts in a false light is wider, giving more marge of manoeuvre to the authorities (two procedures have already started, both against mayors of the opposition for warning that the virus is already in their community).
Another test can be to see what others do. Just one example: in the interview with German TV, Wolfgang Schäuble found the most important to mention that the emergency situation is limited in time and its prolongation has to be approved by Parliament every time.
Finally, avoiding double standards also means judging those who differ with a different measure. Ms Varga would deny it with all her force but there are a lot of examples where the Hungarian government abuses its powers. Although hardly any refugees arrive to the Hungarian boarder (and even less can then pass) the emergency due to refugees is still in force in Hungary. Ms Varga warns from fighting against imaginary enemies when there is a real one. Hungary's government spent the last ten years fighting against imaginary enemies (Soros, the CEU, migrants - they are real but no enemy, etc.) and now, facing a real enemy, wants to use the very same methods. One morning the prime minister announces that there is no need to close schools, the same evening orders to close them. One day the chief physician announces that masks are useless, two days later the prime minister says they are not compulsory only as there is not enough and he himself made one at home - this after the 27th February the Minister for Human Resources (also responsible for health - maybe the name reflects that they run the country as if it were their own enterprise) and then several times the prime minister announced that there is enough material available. And they refused to re-group money from propaganda to health care (propaganda, as opposed to health, has an own ministry).
Articles written by ministers will scare supporters away, but not the virus.

How to deal with "illiberal" corruption?

Two issues keep the debate around the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) going: one is about how to find a mechanism to react to governments which do not comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, i.e. infringe democratic and/or rule of law principles (the infringement of democratic principles is more indirect as the sheer outcome of elections favours the governments of Hungary and Poland - although in Poland the tide may turn - but the circumstances under which these governments win the votes are at least dubious) without resorting to the famous (or rather notorious) Article 7, which is rightly called the "nuclear option" as it is very strong and virtually impossible to implement. It has to be noted also that this "nuclear option" is not directly so nuclear as it strips a country from its voting rights but leaves all other right untouched - of course after this the other member states can vote other sanctions if they are in line with general law.
The other question is also raised in the context of the projects in Hungary where the government is distributing EU funds with an extreme speed - leading to suboptimal decisions in itself - and favours its cronies in this distribution.
As it seems that - at least in Hungary - these two negative phenomena go hand in hand - and the concentration of power and hollowing out of all checks and balances really ensures that cronyism and corruption cannot be brought to court or hindered any other way, including wide publicity, the two questions are mixed together.
Proposals are tabled which would make EU funds conditional on rule of law criteria. In terms of proper use and avoidance of fraud, joining the European Prosecutor's Office is favoured. On the other hand, soon a new Financial Regulation will be voted which will simplify the disbursement of EU funds.
EU structural funds are an important source of economic development, a positive factor in the image of the EU and also help cohesion between the countries (also by enabling that their economic development approaches them to each-other - they are also called cohesion funds). I totally agree with Markko Markkula, president of the (European) Committee of the Regions, who emphasised the importance of these funds in an interview already serving as a preparation to the fight around the new MFF, arguing that the cohesion funds should not be cut. A recent article (and one of a leading Hungarian commentator who can also not be suspected of being on the side of the present Hungarian government, arguing that austerity will not break the government of Orbán) warns that the cut of funds can be counterproductive.
So what?
My proposition is that the decisions (including acceptance of projects and procurement) should be more centralised and also more controls should be applied, covering the cost of these from the funds made available to the country in question. These controls should also depend on whether the coutry joins the European Prosecutors' Office.
This would of course require additional resources which is always difficult to achieve but even more difficult now when EU sources are decreasing due to the Brexit. Therefore the structural funds should be used for this purpose. This would not be such a sensitive cut as what is proposed in the framework of the new "conditionality" proposals. Also, joining the European Prosecutor's Office should be the precondition of applying the simplifications in the new Financial Regulation.