Hungarian conservatives – emerging again?

 New Hungarian conservative parties will be needed once Orbán has disappeared from power but some think they also have a role to play in ousting him. Hungarians are indeed prone to conservativism but like being cared for by the state. The governing party, FIDESz is closest to their general attitude – except its social policies. Its grip on the economy and communications means that it can be defeated only by mobilising the undecided voters. These parties target them and disappointed FIDESz-voters. They sense that the gap which Orbán and his party occupied with success in 1998 and holds since, is opening again.

After FIDESz moved to the right, it won four elections. The traditional left and liberals were fragmented and their bad governance – the country was hard hit by the 2007-2009 crisis as bad management made it vulnerable – also harmed their credibility. Surveys show that undecided voters are more conservative.

This makes it plausible that the force able to replace FIDESz needs the rightwing. Most of these movements and parties cannot yet gain a lot of publicity, the press only rarely reports about them positively. Exceptions are, however, accumulating.

In 2015 Zoltán Kész, an ex-member of FIDESz won the 2015 by-elections in Veszprém, vacated by a local strongman of FIDESz. Next, another disappointed FIDESz-member, Péter Márki-Zay won a mayoral by-election in 2018, in Hódmezővásárhely, another fiefdom of FIDESz. When Márki-Zay founded first a movement, then a party named “Hungary of all”, Mr Kész joined the board. Other members of the board are also known and valued both by the voters of the opposition and the right-wing.

The founder of Új kezdet, (“New start”) is a well known conservative but he resigned to lead his municipality. The president is MP of LMP, a leftist-green party, whose faction is called the joint faction of LMP and of “New Start”. A vice president is independent, another one was member of the leadership of the liberal SzDSz during its eclipse.

The “New world popular party -2022” of a past FIDESZ minister and president of the Academy of Sciences, József Pálinkás started with a professional image (the movement itself was also called “Responsible Professionals”). They appear sometimes in the press – signalling also Pálinkás’ ability to break the wall of silence mentioned. The health expert of the party, who really managed a hospital, is also often invited in the context of the pandemic to independent media. Their team features two prominent foreign policy experts and runs a blog with expert contributors.

Peter Márki-Zay and József Pálinkás are candidates of the primaries in preparation of the 2022 national elections for prime minister. Whether they win or lose, their parties and “New Start” may re-create European conservativism in Hungary. A look at their programmes shows what we can expect from them.

Two of these parties (“Hungary of all” and “New start”) formulate their vision in twelve points (the young revolutionaries of the emblematic 1848 revolution and war of independence also formulated their demands in 12 points). All three aim to correct the distortions of the FIDESz rule – rule of law, fair and equitable laws, reinstallation of democratic institutions, the “New world” even outlined a short term crisis management programme separately from the long term vision. Each wants to stop corruption and join the European Prosecutor’s Office. “New world” and “Hungary of all” expressly mention joining the Eurozone.

Supporting Hungarian minorities in their endeavour to gain their rights within their country is prominent for “New start” and “New world” while “Hungary of all” wants them to be proud of a successful Hungary. “New world” also wants the EU to protect minorities. All three want to make it worth for Hungarians working abroad to come home.

In terms of law and political structures, “New start” emphasises the freedom of civil society and religious communities, “Hungary of all” the freedom of the press while “New world” argues for autonomous institutions and a smaller state. Publishing the files of secret agents of the communist regime is part of the programme of “Hungary of all”.

Economically, while promising fair competition, “New world” wants more EU funds for SMEs, as in their view, large companies are advantaged more than their added value would justify. “Hungary of all” sets on a strong competition authority and calculable environment. “New start” would reform the system of communal work for the jobless and would introduce basic revenue for social integration and social contributions based on needs (including social housing), while “New world” would prolong jobless support, which is extremely short now. Thus, all envisage some state role – even the least “dirigiste” “New world”.

“New start” is the only one to mention abolishing the single key tax system (a controversial topic).

Development of the countryside (including providing schools with local produces) is important for “New world” while “New start” emphasises the importance of local authorities. Sustainability takes an important place in the programmes of “New world” and “New start”.

Education and health are prominent in all programmes with a significant role of the state. “New world” strives for digitisation and spending comparable to leading countries.

As European conservatives have to clarify their attitude to Hungary, they should not forget the real conservatives there. Many of Hungarian voters are waiting for it.

3 years of the European Citizens' Initiative

Article 11(4) of the Lisbon Treaty created the European Citizens’ Initiative, as a new tool for citizens to influence the politics of the European Union. A Regulation was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 16 February 2011 which defined the detailed rules. National authorities were designated to certifying the online support collection system and to verify the statements of support and delivering the relevant certificate as for an initiative to be successful, it has to be backed by at least one million EU citizens, coming from at least 7 out of the 28 member states. A minimum number of signatories is required in each of those 7 member states. The proposal must be in an area where the Commission has the power to propose legislation, for example environment, agriculture, transport or public health. If an initiative receives the necessary number of signatures, the Commission has to take action within 3 months after receiving the initiative.
The organisers get the opportunity to explain in detail the issues raised in their initiative to the Commission and at a public hearing in the European Parliament
The Commission is not obliged to propose legislation as a result of an initiative but has to publish a formal response – published in all 24 EU official languages - spelling out what action it will propose in response to the citizens' initiative, if any, and the reasons for doing or not doing so.. If the Commission decides to put forward a legislative proposal, the normal legislative procedure kicks off: the Commission proposal is submitted to the legislator and, if adopted, it becomes law.
The process can be found here in detail , so I will not talk about it more.

The Commission recently summarised the experience with the initiatives and published a report about it.
Since April 2012 till the date of the report, end March 2015, the Commission has received 51 requests for registration of proposed citizens’ initiatives. 31 of them were registered (16 registrations in 2012, nine in 2013, five in 2014 and one in 2015). 20 proposed initiatives did not fulfil the registration criteria and therefore could not be registered. The most frequently cited reason for refusal was that the subject of the initiative was outside the legislative powers of the EU and thus did not qualify for being a European Citizens’ Initiative.
18 initiatives have reached the end of their collection period (10 others were withdrawn before the end of their collection period). Among those 18, three initiatives have reached the required number of statements of support and were submitted to the Commission. Two of them have already received a formal response from the Commission: 'Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!' ('Right2Water') and 'One of us'.
The first one calls for: 1. The EU institutions and Member States be obliged to ensure that all inhabitants enjoy the right to water and sanitation. 2. Water supply and management of water resources not be subject to ‘internal market rules’ and that water services are excluded from liberalisation. 3. The EU increases its efforts to achieve universal access to water and sanitation.
After the organisers met the Commission and a public hearing took place in the European Parliament, the topic was taken up in the course of actions concerning the Drinking Water Directive. The evaluation of the directive is ongoing. The roadmap will be published shortly The EP Rapporteur presented the first draft of the Environment Committee Report on the Right2Water initiative. The vote in the Committee is provisionally scheduled for 26/05/2015 and the vote in the EP Plenary is provisionally foreseen for 08/06/2015
. The second one calls for a ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos, in particular in the areas of research, development aid and public health.
There was a meeting with the organisers and a public hearing in the European Parliament. As a result, the Commission has decided not to submit a legislative proposal as the policy of the EU is clear and rigorous rules are in place. 156.7 million euros were spent on stem cell research out of a total of 6 billion between 2007 and 2013 and Embryonic stem cells are unique and offer the potential for life-saving treatments, with clinical trials already underway. The Commission will continue to apply the strict ethical rules and restrictions in place for EU-funded research, including not funding the destruction of embryos.
The third one ('Stop vivisection') is under examination by the Commission and will receive an answer by 3 June 2015.
Looking at the aborted and refused initiatives, there are three main areas where most of the initiatives fall into: Social questions (of course the proposal for an unconditional basic income is one of them) like protection of minorities, cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of the regional cultures and a new European poverty criterion or the one to stop legal prositution, animal welfare, like “Dairy Cow Welfare” “Ethics for Animals (and Kids)” and political – some of them outrightly provocative like “Stop TTIP”, the one calling for a self-abolition of the European Parliament and its structures or the one entitled: “Should the current failing form of EG be replaced by one without democratic deficit?”.
A handful of initiatives dealt with environmental questions, among them the one of the three hitherto successful ones.
Still are open , one of them calling for an online collection plpatform for support of citizens’ initiatives, one to stop the climate initiatives except energy efficiency unless other big emitters also agree. A software tool for online data collection enables citizens to support a given initiative and organizers to manage its operations.
Further information can be found here.

The UK and the EU

I cannot let the week-end go without commenting on the speech of David Cameron on the EU. He wants to reform the EU or at least negotiate an "extrawurst" , special conditions, namely participating in the common market but have no other obligations, in particular repatriation of powers, mainly on areas where the U.K. has different traditions from the continental ones. A more flexible, more competitive and more democratic EU - who wouldn't agree? But there is a contradiction: if powers have to be repatriated because the EU is not democratic enough, is this necessary if the reforms succeed and it will be democratic? The powers the EU acquired were delegated by unanimous vote of the member states. It seems most states see the reason of today's problems in insufficient co-operation and not in too much power in the hands of the EU (which is not a bodiless monster in Brussels but the elected governments and also elected MEP-s), Cameron may have an uphill struggle. But he promised a referendum only after he will have agreed on a new type of membership of the UK. What can this new type of membership be: a two-speed Europe where Britain is in the slow lane (and then revenges by leaving the EU for being left in the slow lane? Oh no!). What is the new, more democratic EU going to be? Cameron mentions that the main role should go to national parliaments (not instead of the Council where he and his colleagues have the say, but instead of the European Parliament) as there is no united "European Demos" As there is a united UK demos (don't forget, it is not Britain as not only Scots and Welsh, but also Irish from Northern Ireland constitute its "nation". This model deserves some thought, maybe next week. What is the more flexible EU going to be: "cherry picking" was already refused and is also due to create a total chaos. My favourite scenario: A democratisation, cost cutting and competitivity actions - and maybe also some more flexibility can come out of the negotiations about economic governance and banking union, at least the conclusions of the December European Council point to a direction where serious limitations and tailor-made solutions will replace the "one size fits all" approach initially planned - are already in progress. The UK can keep its opt-outs and maybe generalise them or put them in a nicer light. And then he can say: I have succeeded in reforming Europe and our relation to it so we can stay. By the way: The UKIP wants a referendum now. What would be of the party if the UK would exit the EU? Not just Nigel Farage would lose his well-paying seat in the EP (where, as we have heard , he is also paid for a committee membership where he never works, but the party itself would use his whole basis of existence. Whom would they defend the independence of the UK from? There is a party in Luxembourg which remained a party after its program has gone by keeping to the ideological (populist) base, but I doubt the UKIP could find a similar agenda.

Votewatch: how the Council votes

Votewatch.eu has now started to follow votes in the Council although this is much more difficult. Surprising results: not only the U.K. but also Germany and Austria frequently voted against the majority (29, 16 and 16%, respectively). The U.K. actually also voted most against these two states and vice versa. The countries with the fewest "No" votes in the last three years (of which two were under the "liberation war" government of Viktor Orban) were Lithuania, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania and Slovakia. As far as Hungary is concerend, out of 10 negative votes, 2 fall to the period of the Orban government. The votes recorded are only final formal votes where the motion was accepted. Of course, "no" votes in case of rejected motions would count to be majority votes anyway. It also has to be noted that 65% of votes where a qualified majority was sufficient, unanimity was nevertheless achieved. (analysis based on European Voice

History and national sentiment

Listening to the debates around Horthy and Kádár (the first was the governor of the Hungarian Kingdom which had no king and led Hungary - driven by the hope to get back the territories lost in the peace treaties after the first world war (simply called Trianon in Hungary due to the place where its Hungarian part was signed) from Hitler, the second "reigned" over the time between 1956 (crushing of the Revolution) till the dawn of the system change over the "merriest barrack" of the socialist camp) and noticing that even if two evoke the same facts and both think they are in the centre and are realistically judging these eras, they can draw diametrically opposed conclusions, it was interesting to read an article of Tony Judt (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/books/08judt.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all) in his book: Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (see also: the review by the Guardian ) about the seven-volume "Lieux de memoire" from Pierre Nora where he - end Nora - diagnosed the recent problems in the French historic conscience: on one hand: history and memories have lost their relation to each other - meaning that before, the memories of people about history were shaped by what historical science said about the events and was taught at school while as historical narrative is very little taught now at schools, they lost touch with each-other. It has to be known that on French motorways, not only tourist attractions but also places where important historical events took place, are marked with a board, showing the name of the place and a picture of the event but with no further explanation. I had to search the net for example to identify a place, where the picture showed armed people (the French will apprehend, but by the scenery, they could have been robbers) stopping a post-coach. Well, at home I found out that this was the place where Louis XVI was captured when he tried to escape the revolutionary court which later sentenced him and his wife, Marie-Antoinette, to death. These boards meant something to those who could connect to the historic event and its significance and meaning to the French from the name of the place (other examples being Péronne, Verdun, Ypres from the first world war). The other aspect is maybe best shown that such a board does not show Vichy (at least did not when Judt wrote his book). And the reason is that there is no universally agreed narrative about what it means and it is thus not integrated into the political conscience of the Fifth Republic. This does not mean - writes Judt - that a uniform appraisal is necessary, there are other events which are controversially interpreted (even Jeanne d'Arc, being the favourite of the Le Pens - it was Jean-Marie in Judt's time, now Marine) but that it was not discussed. Mitterand, who consciously tried to celebrate the glory of the French and has thus built and inaugurated memorials all over the country, was conspicuously silent about Vichy. Hungarians have a similar - although not at all silent - conflict with both long periods of the twentieth century - although one could argue that the period before - 1867 to 1914, when Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and when most of the conflicts which resulted in such a bloody harvest, were sawn - is also not processed in national memory and common conscience. A glimmer of hope is that debating began and, as mentioned, a common understanding of the facts may emerge. There are, however, some factors which make it almost impossible to achieve a "minimum of understanding" which, I think, Judt and Nora consider as a precondition: the connection to daily politics, the polarisation of political camps, coupled with the total lack of interest for politics on the part of the majority, and these two, seemingly contradictory factors leave space for purely emotional approaches. And in my opinion, only a rational approach can arrive to this mentioned minimum of understanding. While searching for links for this post, I found an interesting article about the same topic, also inspired by Nora's gigantic enterprise. When I read it, I may return.

What are European officials like? An independent research

The UK Economic and Social Research Council, EU Consent and a private donor financed an interesting research project , about the backgrounds, values, attitudes and motivation of European Commission officials (the Commission is by far the largest European Institution, with about 33 thousand staff ( see details here , more than all other European institutions together).

The project also investigated their opinion on how the Commission works, including the changes introduced by the 2004 reform and the latest big enlargements.

As the Commission supported the research, a representative sample of nearly two thousand officials could be surveyed. Also interviews of different categories of staff were conducted. The research was supported but not influenced by the Commission.

European Voice gave a good summary of the results:
First, the Commission's workforce is more diverse than is often assumed.
Most of them are economists and those who studied natural science are also more than lawyers. More than one-third of the Commission's staff recruited in the last years worked before in business and 90% had already work experience when joining the Commission.
As far as their views about Europe are concerned, only 36% of them are federalists, while 12% believe that the member states should be the central pillars of the Union.
Their motivations are also diverse: competitive remuneration and professional interest are factors of growing importance. Of course most of them share a will to ‘build Europe'.
The administrative reforms did not get a univocal recognition while the best rated president was Delors, but Barroso, the present president came out second after him.
They thought that the Commission is more difficult to manage since enlargement but they appreciated "their talented, enthusiastic and highly motivated colleagues recruited from the ‘new' member states", according to European Voice.

What happened to MALÉV? - updated with the restructuring plan

The European Commission ordered Hungary to have MALÉV, the Hungarian national airlines, to pay back about 350-400 million Euros in illegal state aid. Here is the press release. The Hungarian economic weekly HVG (the original article is only available for subscribers but here you can browse articles about the events)stated that Hungary has do calculate the amount to be repaid (which duty is explicitly in the decision) and to define how the state aid has to be paid back. This aspect will be important later. Also it has to be remarked that if the company is wound up and its assets are transferred or sold at market value.
The decision is dated 9th January 2012 and must be implemented within four months. The 3rd February MALÉV ceased operations, leaving passengers stranded on airports all over the world as not just the flights were cancelled but code-sharing partners also did not take MALÉV passengers and no tickets for other airlines issued by MALÉV were accepted any more. Further information on the last days and implications can be found on the Wikipedia page of MALÉV
Some interesting developments preceded this collapse: the company was declared the company an “organization of strategic importance” which means that a state body has to manage liquidation and the rights of the creditors are substantially limited. MALÉV asked for bankruptcy protection and these two events led the creditors to stop financing (including the lessor of most of its aircraft requesting their blocking, in some cases on airports abroad).
The decision was preceded by a letter to Hungary . This gave the possibility to the Hungarian government to justify the state subsidies by showing how and when MALÉV was a company in difficulties (which would have justified a one-off aid only) and present a restructuring plan (this latter could have saved the situation).
The decision can be attacked in court ( in the case of the Budapest Power Plant , Hungary won such a case).
The Hungarian government was defying the European Commission in several cases (about media law, the new Constitution and its accompanying acts, the pay of the president of the Hungarian National Bank) but did not even hint on trying this now (remember the interpretation of HVG that Hungary can define the way and timing of repayment).
But was or is there any chance?

To start with, MALÉV had a business model, whether good or not, part of which it pursued since the seventies: it enabled travel from the West to the Middle East by having passengers change in Budapest. The schedule of its flights to the Middle East was adapted to this (start from Budapest after the flights from the West arrived). Of course in the times of cold war, an “eastern” airline had a better position in the eyes of Soviet-friendly or “non-aligned” Arab countries, but the model also worked with Cyprus, strictly committed to Western-Europe already then. It was a member of an alliance and had code-sharing agreements and for a while enabled even good connections to the Americas. It employed a significant number of Hungarian sub-contractors and gave about 50% of the traffic on Budapest Airport (see the Wikipedia article referred to above).

Its profitability was, however, shaky, due to its strong links to the Hungarian state – it was not run really as a business. This is why state subsidies were needed to keep it afloat.

In 2003, the new socialist government sacked Mr Váradi its former CEO who established Wizzair , a cheap airline, using a lot of MALÉV staff. MALÉV since tried to compete with cheap airlines, in some cases its prices were lower that Wizzair’s to a more remote airport in the same city. Wizzair was one of those companies who called the attention of the European Commission to the state aid to MALÉV (there was at least one other company and of course this state aid would not have remained hidden anyway).

Another surprising fact:
The company which directly caused MALÉV’s demise (by initiating the liquidation proceedings) is not a supplier of MALÉV but has bought debts of the company and is linked to the organisation which is the receiver of MALÉV now. (If creditors do not agree to the protection – “chapter 11” by American terminology -, then the proceedings are transformed into liquidation.)

Beyond the state aid, MALÉV was first privatised and then re-nationalised. The reason for re-nationalisation was that the Russian owner, who seemed to be an appropriate professional investor familiar with the airline industry, did not prove to be useful professionally and its share was acquired by an also Russian bank. Any further re-structuring was hindered by this ownership as this bank also was a huge creditor of the company. So the credits had to be repaid and/or securities given and the bank’s share re-purchased. This happened in 2010, in the last months of the outgoing socialist government of Gordon Bajnai . The government secured the agreement of FIDESZ, due to win the next elections in April 2010. They also prepared a restructuring plan but FIDESZ refused to co-operate further in formulating this plan and without them neither further details could be fixed, nor negotiations with prospective partners could be started as it was clear that this government will have no say any more when the actions will really materialise.
Nothing was done even since and now it seems to be too late – the leased aircraft is away, new players occupied the best landing slots in the airports etc.

Some speculation: what could have been the solution? The easiest (followed by Alitalia and Olympic Airways ) could have been to have a new company take over the assets, slots and contracts of MALÉV (see above: at market value – maybe that was the problem as this would not have enabled a cheap takeover by a “friendly” investor) and leave the old company with its debts, including the repayment of state aid. The restructuring of the company by re-scheduling debt and streamlining it would have been a more difficult option and only if the EC had accepted that in this case state aid was not illegal. What is however quite clear: considering and publicising that the government will take an option - at least delaying repayment of state aid - could have enabled a soft landing, without leaving “the people” (the favourite term of the governing party) sitting on airports, sub-contractors and the airport suddenly without revenue. Companies under normal liquidation normally operate and this enables a much better sale of their assets and saving also their name. This is due to the fact that in liquidation, the first priority is to pay so-called “liquidation costs” which include the operating expenses accrued during liquidation and thus the company is able to get supplies for its daily operation. This was the case in much more difficult cases, like steel mills, dairy companies etc. before.

The government commissioner responsible for exploring and prosecuting “the previous government’s sins” declared publicly, that the state also has an obligation amounting to billions of forints to the owner of Budapest Airport (to whom the state sold it). He mentioned a strange term which raised suspicion immediately (but not in him): senior and also junior debtors have to be paid. These latter terms are namely used in bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. After the privatisation contracts have been published recently, it turned out that it is true what the previous minister of finance, Péter Oszkó already hinted: This has to be done only when the airport itself goes bankrupt due to loss of traffic from MALÉV. And as other airlines (among them Ryanair, an arch-rival of Wizzair, but this is another story) crowd in to occupy slots, this seems to be improbable.

Péter Oszkó had a lot of things to explain and most if his communication about the re-nationalisation and the restructuring plans occurred through sms-es so no proofs. He is now member of the board of the holding company of Wizzair. This latter position he gained about a year after he ceased to deal with MALÉV.

The responsible minister for national development recently answered to a question of MALÉV in Parliament: “I am only in office since the 23rd December, I cannot take responsibility for this affair”.

European Council - tasks for growth and jobs

Too much has been written about the financial stability pact (about budget discipline) and commentators are usually disappointed about the result achieved on the European Council the 30th January in further points concentrating on growth and jobs which were also on the agenda. J. M. D. Barroso, the president of the European Commission, published his presentation on the European Council and also his other materials (you have to go down the page as there are only newer items on it).
The presentation contains a series of important data and observations. I would call the attention to the balance data on page 3 and youth unemployment rates on page 8. The first one clearly shows that the 2011 surplus of Hungary is just transitional while youth unemployment in Hungary is in the mid-range of Europe.
It is worth looking at the nice chart on page 5. Hungary has red marks in the following areas in this chart:
Fiscal consolidation (interestingly long term sustainability is not red)
Fiscal framework
Taxation (I assume mainly collection of taxes and fighting tax evasion)
Active labour market policy
Labour market participation (the activity rate in Hungary is disastrous)
Business environment and SMEs (in spite of government rhetoric)
Public services and cohesion policy.
It is clear, given the dominance of big European players on the banking market that there is no red area in financial stability (although I doubt that the housing market in Hungary would be healthy but this is also caused by the perturbations due to the big foreign exchange housing debt and the fairly confuse measures trying to handle that.

Update on "Future in the past" (about a dentist)

In a previous post I wrote about the benefits the Orbán-government is giving the dentist of the Orbán family. Now, a new information was published by HVG:
All dentists who want to receive EU money have to register (and pay) to the Development Office for Hungarian Dental Tourism which is established and managed among others by the dentist of the Orbán Family again. Will the European Union recover its memories?

How did the Hungarian presidency do?

A lot has been said and written about this. I try to summarise here the main legislative initiatives: which succeeded and which failed.

Economic governance: failed on one question where no political agreement could be reached. The issue is going to be put back in the agenda by the Polish  presidency which seems to attribute a lower priority to this question. Hungary did not join the Euro plus agreement as one of a handful states citing "tax competition" as the reason. Enikő Győri, state secretary for European affairs stated that the left in the Parliament was looking for the right thing (growth) at the wrong place (budgetary discipline) however, the one difference left (from over 2000) is about budgetary discipline and not about growth: whether sanctions should be automatic.

Roma strategy and Danube strategy: the Roma strategy was initiated in the Parliament by a FIDESZ MEP of Roma origin and well received. The Commission (partly its Directorate Generals under the Hungarian commissioner (nominated by the previous governing party) was swift in working out the strategy which was endorsed by the Council. The approach was criticised by human rights groups as minimalistic, but it has to be recognised that the EU does not really has competencies in this area.  The Danube strategy was already in the making when Hungary took over (just like the Swedes had a Baltic strategy accepted, it was logical that the Hungarian presidency aims at a Danube strategy and the other members of the Trio (Spain and Belgium) probably gave a helping hand) and accepted during the presidency's term, These are issues where no EU money is directly involved and thus their real impact remains to be seen.

Authenticity of the electronic edition of the Official Journal: pursued with ambition and  intelligence but still pending on the issue of which treaty article is the legal base. This could further reduce the use of paper and thus help the environment but also improve efficiency of those who work with European legislation, Clearly a must in the 21st century.

No result on labeling of „high-tech foodstuff” i.e. genetically modified foodstock and "new foodstock" in general failed but a general food labeling regulation was finally accepted the 6th july. This latter harmonises the indication of ingredients and nutritional value on packaging and is a good result in face of differing interests.

"The outgoing Hungarian EU Presidency failed to adequately tackle some of Europe’s biggest environmental problems, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) has said in an assessment. While positive on mercury, biodiversity and GMO cultivation, EEB said several issues were undermined by a lack of political commitment and leadership"  http://www.eeb.org/EEB/index.cfm/news-events/news/assessment-of-hungarian-presidency-bad-on-climate-energy-good-on-biodiversity-and-mercury/

Croatian accession negotiation – closed but no accession date fixed explicitly by the Council, although July 2013 seems to be the date.

Energy policy: The presidency achieved a deal on the 2020 energy strategy just before the Japanese disaster and the new strategy also creates more transparency and eliminates some of the European Gas network's inefficiencies (gas dead.ends of which Hungary is one and which hinder that Eu countries share their resources in case of shortages or other problems).
In transport, Hungary brought to decision the agreement on cross-boarder traffic fines (not a big joy for some motorist) which was a long-lasting saga. Also, agreement was reached on the Eurovignette for trucks.

In internal affairs, strictening the rules for sexual abuse of children and child pornography, an agreement about Frontex helping member states with immigration problems were positive but European Voice quotes MEPs that in this area legislative work was hindered by the political quarrels over Hungarian domestic policy.

It was a mistake to set the aim of getting Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area, the achievement of recognition that they are technically ready was what could be and was attained.

Agreement was reached that the suspension of the Schengen accord is only allowed in exceptional circumstances but the presidency did not react to the Danish measures contravening this.

I think the reader can draw conclusions, my aim was to collect in one place most of what could be collected on the main legislative measures as legislation is the field where the presidency (of the Council) is active. Political issues are treated in the European Council which has a permanent president.