Brexit and the European Court of Justice - proposed BREXIT guidelines of the European Council

One of the spectacular arguments of the brexiteers was to liberate the U.K. from the "tyranny" of the European Court of Justice (in general from European lawmaking).
The guidelines formulated by the team of Donald Tusk put important limitations to this ambition.
This is partially related to the transition period, partially to the new arrangements.
The new arrangements will require a judicial authority to treat the conflicts which arise from the interpretation of the agreement and to sanction the non-compliance of the parties (remember, the judicial remedies were one of the sensitive points of the TTIP). The EU proposes this to be the European Court of Justice. Another solution, however, may be arbitration - as mentioned, one of the stumbling blocks of TTIP. Whether the EU agrees to that, is up for a bargain.
Also, if the new arrangements are not agreed within the two years from when article 50 was triggered (i.e. end of March 2019), the parties need transitional arrangements. It was already floated by the EU that EU law may remain in force in the U.K. - and this is more in the interest of the U.K. that the EU, therefore the EU has a leverage in this and will use it to make the European Court of Justice the arbiter on the implementation of European law also during this period.
And finally: cases in progress, not just before the European Court of Justice but also administrative instances (like infringement procedures of the European Commission) and cases which may be initiated later based on the period when the U.K. was still a member and was thus bound by European Law. The negotiating guidelines explicitly mention that in these cases the European Court of Justice has to retain jurisdiction even after the departure of the U.K. from the EU.
So - like a lot of other things - this is not so clear cut, as the "Leave" campaigners tried to depict. Surprises still in the making...

Ever closer union - why and how?

Do not be deceived, I will not philosophise about federalism, power to the EU or power away from it. These are important questions and are dealt with on this blog several times, connected to concrete questions.
What I want to recall here, is just where this term comes from and how it became an obsession.
First of all, the reference is to the first recital of the Rome Treaty, creating the European Economic Community or simply said, the Common Market. Great, let's see whether the Rome treaty actually contains this formulation, or something else. We open EUR-Lex, look for the Rome treaty and find it - surprise, surprise, as the United Kingdom was not among the founding members - in Dutch, French, German and Italian (in alphabetic order of the name of the languages) - Belgium spoke French and Dutch and Luxembourg German and French, therefore four languages for the six founding states. No English, sorry. Here is the link: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11957E/TXT - EN stands for the language of the interface, not of the text.
As a devout European and speaking some European languages (one from each main language family), I can try to find the phrase in the existing versions. In Dutch: "verbond", German: "Zusammenschluß". However, in French: "union", in Italian: "unione". So far tie.
The English translation is, however available on the Commission archives.
Let's see this text: it talks about: "lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of
Europe".
Before continuing, a look at the Maastricht treaty shows a new text as the first recital: "to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities" while the last recital already continues the line of thought: " to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,.

Some commentators conclude from the first recital, that it has nothing to do with political union, but targets to bring the peoples of Europe closer together. Reading the other linguistic versions, this interpretation seems close. The member states creating the European Union, however, saw their enterprise expanding co-operation to non-economic political areas, although at different depth - the famous "three-pillar approach" abandoned by the Lisbon Treaty -  as the further implementation of the original idea, thus giving it a more express political dimension retroactively.

I did not really hear any "federalist" to quite this passage to support any idea of closer co-operation while this was often quoted as the stumbling block by Britons - be euroskeptic or just opportunist like Cameron - hindering their country's commitment to the EU. The thoughts I outlined above are quoted in defence of loosening the union by Fullfacts, which calls itself "the UK’s independent factchecking charity" - and is actually fairly neutral

So what is left is to quote again the  final phrase of the already quoted recital of the Maastricht treaty: "...in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity". This can be seen as a limit, or even as a guiding principle what this ever closer union will really look like.

The Schrems-Facebook saga continues

The Irish High Court turns to the European Court of Justice with a reference to preliminary ruling in the second case of the Austrian law student Maximilian Schrems against Facebook.
In the first, the European Curt of Justice invalidated in its judgment the "Safe Harbour" agreement between the U.S. and the EU. (Other "adequacy decisions" declaring that countries comply with European data protection principles, can be found here.)
This system enabled U.S. companies to self-certify and register at the U.S. Department of Commerce that they comply with EU data protection rules.
Based on the Snowden revelations, the European Court of Justice found that the "indiscriminate and mass surveillance" of the U.S. government agencies and the lack of legal redress for EU citizens (which redress was ensured for U.S. citizens) against illegitimate use of data by them is not compatible with EU data protection principles and therefore the Commission decision that companies participating in this arrangement don't have the right to use EU citizens' personal data based on this was invalidated.
An alternative was that the U.S. companies commit themselves through "standard contractual clauses" defined by the European Commission to ensure the same protection as if they were obliged by European Law. This is now also attacked before the Irish High Court, who decided to refer a question to the European Court of Justice. This was announced early June but the question is not available yet on the Court website.
Meanwhile the Irish High Court also endorsed some requests to testify in front of it as "Amicus Curiae". The U.S. also received this right. The representative of the U.S. will testify under oath and is not bound by U.S. secrecy laws.
The 8th June actually the European member states endorsed the "Privacy shield", the system intended to replace the "Safe Harbour". The U.S. ensured the adequate legal redress also for European citizens and thus - apart from the question of how indiscriminate and mass character the U.S. surveillance has - the main problem was declared solved.
The arrangement had no smooth ride neither in the U.S., where the republicans introduced last minute amendments to the bill, weakening its guarantees, nor in the EU, where the so-called "Article 29 working party", the community of national Data Protection Authority chiefs (which will become the European Data Protection Board, a much more powerful and institutionalised group after the entering into force in May 2018 of the new General Data Protection Regulation - a post about that will follow) and the European Data Protection Supervisor requested changes to the already agreed text and of course this was very difficult to make the U.S. swallow. Certainly, this "Privacy shield" will also be tested in courts. However, the changes in U.S. law will also influence the decision on the standard contract clauses, as their government environment has changed.
One interesting aspect of the U.S. rules on personal data access of the government is that they are valid in principle to subsidiaries of U.S. companies, even to companies outside the U.S. who have a subsidiary or important operations in the U.S.  This was, however weakened when Microsoft won a case in Ireland, and thus does not have to disclose data to U.S. authorities.
The opinion of the EDPS on the "Privacy shield" can be found here.

The "Google case" - right to be forgotten by search providers

„Dumm hat Glück” - stupid is lucky, says the German. Sometimes lazy people also have luck: I did not have the energy to comment about the „right to be forgotten” case involving Google search results but recent days brought new developments, so I have an occasion to make up for this.

We read from time to time that “Google is evil”. Even Google gives nice results for this. And we also read sometimes interesting reactions to that. But it is not just Google. What appears once on the net, will stay there (or at least in references or at least in the cache of some computer) forever. So Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission responsible for Justice, fundamental rights and citizenship made the “right to be forgotten” an important element of the EU data protection reform. We will give links to more recent materials on the reform below, and the blog quoted above also carries an analysis of the judgment of the European Court of Justice.

The case will be called “Google Spain”, it carries the number C-131/12 and the judgment can be found here . It says that the operator of a search engine is responsible for the processing it executes on personal data which appear on web pages of third parties and is obliged to remove the data from its search results on a legitimate request of the data subject, even if the data remain on the original web page. There are conditions, however, among others for the processing to fall under European law, and the Court also explained one aspect of the legitimacy of the request.

A Spanish citizen sued Google to remove from its search results data concerning him. The Court found that given that Google has an operation in Spain whose activity was found to be related to presenting the search results to Spanish users. The processing of the data and the presentation of search results was not done by Google Spain, who was only selling advertisements to be shown on the Spanish search result pages. This was sufficient for the Court to say that the activity was related. On the other hand, the Court also said that there may be reasons of overriding public interest which would justify that the search engine does not remove the data from its search results.

What is important in this judgment, that although the “right to be forgotten” will only be enshrined (if the Member States and the European Parliament approve – see a recent argument by the British minister of Justice) in new data protection regulation now under preparation, it already recognised based on the present legal framework that data subjects have the right not only to request the deletion of their data from the records of those who process their data, but also the indirect appearance of these data on the Internet.

This of course has consequences to all who provide references to data others put on the web. But also means that even if some data cannot be deleted (like official documents published), they may have to disappear from secondary sources, thus making finding this information more difficult or even impossible. If will be an interesting question whether the search results of the primary publisher of the information also will have to “forget” the information.

The saga is, however continuing as Google receives thousands of requests to remove information from its search results, and took an overly cautious approach and removed links to several articles on a public personality but was forced to retreat and reinstate the references.

For those who want to read more, here is a thorough analysis. And the Guardian, who was one of those whose articles were removed, who gave also a good reporting of the case.

On data protection reform, here is the latest text under discussion by the Council.

"Suspension or no suspension?"

The tenth anniversary of the "big bang" enlargement and thus the accession of Hungary was also marked by some controversy. Some Court decisions against Hungary in infringement procedures (I will return to these later) and a controversy about disbursement of EU funds. So let's now speak about this and return to a summary of these ten years later.

The European commission is asking for additional information on the new system of managing EU funds in Hungary and asked the Hungarian authorities not to send new requests for disbursements (invoices) to the Commission before the workings of the new system is clarified. This is not a suspension of payments in the sense that payments on already submitted claims are going to be done. It is quite logical, these funds were disbursed under the old system which was working in a way (according to information from OLAF, there were twelve cases where OLAF proposed further follow-up (which can mean criminal prosecution, recovery of amounts paid or disciplinary action). The situation is that OLAF cannot directly take disciplinary action or initiate prosecution, it is up to the national authorities do it. The low percentage of criminal charges brought by the national prosecutors against fraudsters embezzling EU funds was the reason why the Commission proposed to set up a European Prosecutor's Office which would bring in these charges.

The Hungarian change came – and this shows the ignorance or lack of political feel, or even worse, lack of interest or understanding towards European developments – at an inopportune time: the Commission was strongly called upon in the report of the Court of Auditors and the discharge resolution (which accepts the report on the previous year and evaluates the management of the EU budget) by the Council and the Parliament to do more to tackle the loss of EU funds due to irregular and/or fraudulent claims for reimbursement submitted and not controlled by the member states.

The background is that while administrative expenditure and in general expenditure areas where the Commission directly spends EU money, get since years a "green" mark from the Court of Auditors, meaning that error rates are below the 2% materiality limit, i.e. are in the normal range, in the area of agricultural and structural funds, there is an error rate which is significantly beyond that. And the reason is that the member states' implementing and audit authorities do not provide the assurance requested that this spending really happens also in the quality expected. Unjustified costs are paid, documentation is lacking or erroneous affecting more than the (in)famous 2% (the materiality limit of 2% means that this is the level of errors which is considered a level where the cost of introducing additional controls is exceeding already the savings (improvement) which could be expected from them, and therefore this level of error is considered as inevitable). It can be disputed whether this level really is at 2% (some suggest it may be higher in complex areas), it is commonplace, however, that the authorities of the member states are too lenient towards their beneficiaries – among others because beyond the obvious economic interest, there is a political pressure to spend the funds assigned. This is evidently visible in Hungary, where the slow catch-up at the start makes the rate of spending an obvious target, in particular as the negotiations on the 2014-2020 financial framework did not result in a spectacular success for the government, so they want to differentiate themselves from the previous government by spending better.

So the Commission is finally planning to introduce a stricter monitoring and re-auditing of the implementation of EU funds by the member states, and it was in this process when the announcement by the Hungarian authorities to further centralise the implementation system and eliminate some actors in it came. And it is clear that at least a side-effect of this (if not the objective) will be less hassle – which would be nice if it would eliminate administrative hassle and unnecessary complications, on which the Commission is also working – and a quicker spending. This, however, entails more risk of irregularities being left unnoticed. And this risk – and weakening of the control system - the Commission cannot afford when its main task is to reinforce controls. Had the Hungarian decisionmakers taken this into account, we were better off now.

Other conflicts between the EU and Hungary

The excessive deficit procedure was not the only point of conflict – in fact not even the main one – between the EU and Hungary. And although some people in Hungary complain that the EU has lost leverage on Hungary by letting it out of the procedure, I would not support measures designed for economic purposes to be used on political disagreements. First of all, this would further fuel anti-EU propaganda, but probably also anti-EU sentiment in Hungary and could also lead to a legal defeat of the EU which would harm its prestige even more. I also doubt whether the EU is the right institution to be judge and even less one fighting party in political conflicts in Hungary. There are, however other pending questions – the fourth amendment of the fundamental law (ex constitution) and also the general questions around the measures limiting democracy and political freedoms, the Tavares-report (or in Hungarian ) and the article 7 procedure it proposes (working documents can also be found here ). The Commission on its part indicated that infringement procedure may be launched because of the fourth amendment (which in Hungary has a totally different connotation than the fourth amendment of the U.S. constitution). Of course to launch of the article 7 procedure is not so simple. It can be initiated by one third of the Member States, the Parliament or the Commission. The Council will most probably not initiate it, the Commission is reluctant to apply the „nuclear option”, in particular as this – and the Romanian – case supports strongly the quest for a less drastic but more flexible tool for the Commission to sanction a breach of European values (mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union). (The Commission also wants a framework be created to analyse the conditions for applying Article 7 .) Rui Tavares proposes this step to be taken by the Parliament. There are in fact three phases: Phase 1: The Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Phase 2: The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, and Phase 3: The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. Phase 2 can only be proposed by one third of the member states of by the Commission, i.e. the Parliament has no right of initiative in this phase. Phase 3 requires no specific initiative, it can be (but is not automatically) a consequence of phase 2. See: here So a majority in the Parliament and a four fifth majority in the Council is necessary even for the first phase (and unanimity in the European Council to start the second phase). This is not possible without consent of at least part of the members of the EPP to which FIDESZ belongs. Several analyses has appeared in the Hungarian press, in particular following the leak of a purported discussion on the Dubrovnik meeting of EPP leaders (where FIDESZ was not present) about extraditing the FIDESZ from the EPP. This was vehemently denied afterwards. In the following EP debate on Hungary – while in previous debates Joseph Daul, the leader of the EPP faction forcefully defended the Hungarian government – the EPP was represented only by Frank Engel, who resorted to general statements and was very lukewarm. (His contribution is only published in French ) It is, however, very doubtful whether ever the necessary majority will be achieved. The amendments to the Tavares report are arriving, so let’s wait what will be the final text. I retort from details of diplomatic and less diplomatic exchanges between Orbán and other conservative European leaders, as it is totally unforeseeable when they will decide to take steps and whether this will not be attributed to personal sensitivity rather than to political differences by FIDESZ propaganda.

European Court Cases affecting Hungary - part two

This time about a case which got some publicity in Hungary and one which did not. It concerns customer protection, which is in the powers of the EU as a unified market clearly requires uniform consumer protection rules. The cases were so-called "references for preliminary ruling" where a national court dealing with a topic which is subject to European law, can ask the European Court of Justice to interpret a European regulation or directive. A lot of these cases are about whether a certain national law is in line with European legislation as if it is not, it cannot be applied. In most cases if a directive is not implemented correctly, the directive should be applied, except against individuals if the national law is unfavourable to the State (this means that a Member State cannot benefit from its own failure to implement the directive). (for example Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt). But also interpretation of a regulation can be asked from the Court. In the case (C 472/10) between the National Authority for Consumer Protection (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság) and Invitel Távközlési Zrt, a telecommunications company, the Hungarian court proceedings were about the right of the provider to charge its cost from expenses due to a specific form of payment to the client who chose this form of payment. The client had a contract - fairly frequent - where in exchange for a benefit (like free or cheaper purchase of equipment) the client undertook not to cancel the contract for a certain binding period. Thus, it did not have the possibility to chose another provider due to the increase of the charge. Another aspect of the fee increase was also taken into account by the Court: " term included in the general business conditions of consumer contracts" enabling "unilateral amendment of fees connected with the service to be provided, without setting out clearly the method of fixing those fees or specifying a valid reason for that amendment". The Court set out some guidelines in judging terms in the general conditions invalid: "The national court must determine, inter alia, whether, in light of all the terms appearing in the general business conditions" "and in the light of the national legislation" whether "the reasons for, or the method of, the amendment of the fees connected with the service to be provided are set out in plain, intelligible language and, as the case may be, whether consumers have a right to terminate the contract". Thus, the reason and method of the change of price must be set out clearly in the general conditions, but the absence of the right to terminate the contract is also a factor to be considered. Thus, the general interpretation in the Hungarian press that all clauses in the general conditions which give the provider the right to change the price are invalid, is too wide, there are conditions under which price increases - in particular if there are elements of cost which change - can be valid. There is one factor I miss actually from among these factors: it is the possibility of the consumer to change some behaviour to escape from the price increase. In this concrete case, the fee was tied to a certain method of payment and the change of payment method may have been open to the customer. The other question was whether the national authority has the right to declare the clause found invalid by the national court invalid in respect of all other contracts. The answer of the European Court of Justice to this question was also yes: "it does not preclude the declaration of invalidity of an unfair term included in the standard terms of consumer contracts in an action for an injunction, provided for in Article 7 of that directive, brought against a seller or supplier in the public interest, and on behalf of consumers, by a body appointed by national legislation from producing, in accordance with that legislation, effects with regard to all consumers who concluded with the seller or supplier concerned a contract to which the same general business conditions apply, including with regard to those consumers who were not party to the injunction proceedings" This means that if national legislation gives the right to the consumer protection or similar authority to declare invalid the clause which was found invalid by a court also in respect of consumers who were not parties to these court proceedings. The other case (C 137/08) between VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. and Ferenc Schneider , the question again is the validity of a clause in the general conditions, this time the court having jurisdiction for a case between the service provider and the client. It is normal practice to assign a court which has jurisdiction in a case. This is also often contained in the clauses of general contractual conditions. Under Hungarian law, the court on the seat or residence of the defender has default jurisdiction. That would mean that the service providers suing customers would have to sue them at the court where they live and this is usually avoided by this clause, prescribing the jurisdiction of the court close to the service provider. As these are in the bigger cities, typically in Budapest, they can be assumed to be usually more experienced in business law. The court in which the case, in conjunction with which the preliminary ruling was requested, suspected that this clause of assigning jurisdiction may be invalid and thus asked the European Court of Justice whether it can refuse to handle it. The question was also raised whether a clause in a contract can be considered invalid when the client did not contest its validity before. The Court suspended the case until the judgment in another (C243/08) between Pannon GSM Zrt. and Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi where it was established that: "The national court is required to examine, of its own motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task." Thus, the court could declare on its own motion invalid the its assignment and refuse to handle the case. A more interesting question is, which finally has to be decided by the national court and sorry enough, I did not find any information about the result of the case in the Hungarian court, whether such an assignment can be declared invalid. The court found that a “term whose purpose is to confer jurisdiction in respect of all disputes arising under the contract on the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier has his principal place of business, obliges the consumer to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which may be a long way from his domicile. This may make it difficult for him to enter an appearance. In the case of disputes concerning limited amounts of money, the costs relating to the consumer’s entering an appearance could be a deterrent and cause him to forgo any legal remedy or defence. Such a term thus falls within the category of terms which have the object or effect of excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action”. Thus, taking into account the circumstances, such a term may be invalid. The court did not establish that such a term is necessarily invalid, just that it can be invalid (“must be considered in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in question (see Freiburger Kommunalbauten, paragraph 22)”) and that if it is, the court assigned in the contract can refuse to deal with the case. There is one gap in the argumentation of the court: as mentioned, in Hungary the default court is the one on the seat or domicile of the defendant, thus, when the customer wants to sue the provider, the default court is also not necessarily one close to him/her. On the other hand, the argument is valid when (as in the concrete case) the provider sues the customer.

Hungarian cases at the European Cout of Justice part 1 - some taxes

I collected some cases of the European Court of Justice in the area of consumer protection and taxes where Hungary was affected. I start with taxes, the second part will deal with consumer protection cases. Let’s start with a tax case where Hungary won against the Commission. The Court ruled in its judgement in the case C 253/09 about the deduction from the base of the personal income tax payable on the sale of property and about the deduction of the transfer tax paid on the purchase of property of the transfer tax paid on property sold by the same person (although it is paid by the buyer) that it is not discriminatory if only amounts paid for properties purchased can be deducted from the tax base of property sold where the property purchased is in Hungary. This sounds logical, as it was also established by the Court, saying that “there is a direct link between the tax advantage granted and the initial levy. First, that advantage and the tax levy are applied to one and the same person and, second, they both relate to the same tax” and “that the objective of the legislation at issue is to avoid – upon the purchase of a second principal residence in Hungary – the double taxation of the capital invested in the purchase of the previous residence that has been sold”. However, the Court looked a little further. Firstly it established that these rules constitute a discrimination but recognised that in light of the above arguments this discrimination is justified by pursuing and objective in public interest (i.e. to preserve the coherence of the tax system and also: "If taxpayers not having paid the tax at issue previously were able, under the tax regime at issue, to benefit from the tax advantage concerned, they would take unfair advantage of taxation that was not applicable to their previous purchase outside Hungary.") Interestingly, no specific arguments are found in the judgement about the transfer tax but the same logic would apply here, except that the tax in not paid by the same person (but was paid at the time of purchase by the seller, although on a value at that time).
The COurt made an interesting statement, by also giving its opinion about tax harmonisation: “While the property transactions carried out in other Member States might also have been subject to similar or even identical taxes to that at issue, it must be noted, however, that in the current stage of the development of EU law, the Member States enjoy a certain autonomy in the area of taxation provided they comply with EU law, and are not obliged therefore to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the other Member States in order, inter alia, to eliminate the double taxation.” So, according to the Court, one way of further integration can be a harmonization of these taxes also and a mutual recognition of taxes paid in another member state.

This harmonization has relevance to a problem now widely discussed, the importance of which is secondary but some way emblematic. The issue is the registration tax and the amendment of the law about road transport, which introduced draconian fines for Hungarians who avoid the – very high though recently decreased – registration tax on passenger cars by registering their car in a neighbouring country where this tax does not exist or is lower. There is a European Directive on the harmonisation of car taxes, mainly targeted at the tax continuously paid in different countries on vehicles registered in that country. The annex to this directive lists a number of specific taxes in different countries but the registration tax in Hungary is not listed. There is also a draft directive, which wants to harmonise further the conditions of the obligation to re-register cars moved from one member state to another. In both the directive and the draft, there is a precise definition of the residence which defines where a car has to be registered and pay taxes. In contrast to this definition, the Hungarian law does not define residence but takes the registration in the residence register as a formal condition. There are two lists of conditions, one for the driver, which acknowledges the situation of those who are abroad temporarily (for work, for example) but the formulation of the conditions for the owner (operator) of the vehicle are chaotic. Driving a car rented abroad or registered on a foreign company – for which the driver may work – is, however, only authorised for one day for someone who does not have a temporary residence abroad. This is also causing problems. For those, however, who stay abroad but do not want to give up their permanent residence in Hungary (or have a temporary residence in Hungary) to go to Hungary in a car registered on their name can mean a fine of up to 3200 Euro and losing their car. This is clearly offending the freedom of establishment and of move within the EU and also the spirit of the mentioned directive, and the re-registration directive is still far away and has only partial impact. Recently a judgement of the Court in the joined cases C 578/10 to C 580/10, can mean some hope that at least when their case comes to the European Court of Justice, the Hungarian regulation may be declared contravening European Law. The judgement namely concerns the Dutch registration tax, and says: “that Article 56 EC must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes legislation of a Member State which requires residents who have borrowed a vehicle registered in another Member State from a resident of that State to pay, on first use of that vehicle on the national road network, the full amount of a tax normally due on registration of a vehicle in the first Member State, without taking account of the duration of the use of that vehicle on that road network and without that person being able to invoke a right to exemption or reimbursement where that vehicle is neither intended to be used essentially in the first Member State on a permanent basis nor, in fact, used in that way.”, which means that not only the tax paid regularly, but also the tax paid on registration cannot be levied on a vehicle which is not used “essentially in the” country “on a permanent basis”. By the way, the Hungarian registration tax was once subject to proceedings at the European Court of Justice (joined cases C-290/05 and C-333/05), when the question was again about proportionality (also referred to in the judgement in question), i.e. that the registration tax on used vehicles has to take into account the depreciation of the vehicle, i.e. can be levied only on basis of its real value and not on its purchase value.